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DIALOGIC FEDERALISM: CONSTITUTIONAL POSSIBILITIES
FOR INCORPORATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
IN THE UNITED STATES
CATHERINE POWELLt
Where, after all, do universal rights begin? In small places, close to
home-so close and so small that they cannot be seen on any maps of
the world .... Unless these rights have meaning there, they have little
meaning anywhere. Without concerned citizen action to uphold them
close to home, we shall look in vain for progress in the larger world.
-Eleanor Roosevelt'
While the U.S. Constitution assigns the power to make and adopt
treaties to the federal government, several state and local govern-
ments have "adopted" human rights treaties and other international
norms, often in response to constituent pressures that are more effec-
tively mobilized at the subnational level . For example, in the absence
of federal ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All
t Associate Clinical Professor of Law, Columbia Law School; Executive Director,
Human Rights Institute; B.A., Yale University (1987); M.P.A., Princeton University,
Woodrow Wilson School in Public and International Affairs (1991); J.D., Yale Law
School (1992). 1 would like to thank the following people for their generous advice,
support, and encouragement: Jose Alvarez, Eyal Benvenisti, Michael Doff, Martin Fla-
herty, Katherine Franke, Louis Henkin, James Liebman, Henry Monaghan, Gerald
Neuman, Mark Quarterman, Judith Resnik, Peter Spiro, Susan Sturm, and Kendall
Thomas. I would also like to acknowledge Giliane Cherubin and Rabecca Cross for
their invaluable research assistance, as well as Paul Bond and Meghan Irmler of the
University of Pennsylvania Law Review.
Eleanor Roosevelt, Address at a United Nations Ceremony in New York (Mar.
27, 1958), in Peter Meyer, The International Bill of Human Rights: A Brief Histoy, at
http://pailwilliams.com/globalrights/history.html (citation omitted).
I have put "adopted" in quotes because state and local governments cannot
technically adopt treaties, although they can incorporate international human rights
standards into state and local law simply by enacting legislation reflecting these norms.
While the Constitution provides that the President "shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate to make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur," U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, it specifically prohibits state govern-
ments from making treaties without the consent of Congress, id. at art. 1, § 10, cl. 3.
For the purposes of this Article, I capitalize "States" to refer to nation-states in the in-
ternational law sense, and de-capitalize "states" to refer to the 50 states of the United
States.
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Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), San Francisco
has incorporated "principles of CEDAW" into binding local law. In
the death penalty context, where the federal government has not yet
opted to ratify the Second Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Second Optional Protocol to
the ICCPR) , aimed at the abolition of the death penalty, a handful of
cities have urged their states, and in some cases the federal govern-
ment, to support a moratorium, relying on the United Nations Com-
mission on Human Rights' call for such a moratorium.
What are the constitutional implications of this and other moves
to bypass the federal government in incorporating and enforcing in-
ternational human rights? Discussions about the allocation of author-
ity between federal and subfederal systems in the implementation of
international human rights law typically proceed by staking out one of
two initial positions At one end of the spectrum, a traditional consti-
tutional theory takes a restrictive view of state and local authority, en-
visioning hierarchical imposition of federally implemented interna-
tional law norms through the federal treaty power" and determination
3 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
openedfor signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW].
4 See SAN FRANcIscO, CAL., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, ch. 12K (2001) (providing the
local San Francisco law entitled "Local Implementation of the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)"),
available at http://www.amlegal.com/sanfranadmin/lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=main-
j.htm&2.0.
5 Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, U.N. GAOR 3rd Comm., 54th
Sess., Annex, at 14, U.N. Doc. A/44/824 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.N.Y.B. 484. For
Congressional discussion on the rejection of the Second Optional Protocol, see U.S.
Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, 138 CONG. REc. 8068, 8071 (1992) [hereinafter U.S. RUDs to the
ICCPR]. For the treaty itself, see the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, S. EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2, at 23, 999 U.N.T.S. 172,
173 [hereinafter ICCPR].
For discussion, see infra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
7 1 have adapted discussion of the following two positions from a framework de-
veloped by Robert M. Cover and T. Alexander Aleinikoff in the context of habeas cor-
pus law to fit the international human rights law context. See Robert M. Cover & T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J.
1035, 1047 (1997) (making a similar observation in the context of habeas corpus law,
in which two paradigms were developed and defended: "a model of hierarchical im-
position of federally determined values; and a model of fragmentation, justifying value
choices by the states"). I am indebted to Judith Resnik for bringing this article to my
attention.
The Supreme Court has opined, "No doubt the great body of private relations
usually fall within the control of [a] state, but a treaty may override its power." Mis-
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of customary international law '9 by federal courts.'0 At the other end of
the spectrum, a revisionist theory assumes greater fragmentation and
authority reserved to the states based on federalism and separation of
powers limits on federal authority." "These divergent images capture
souri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920) (holding that the treaty power authorizes
Congress to legislate under the Necessary and Proper Clause in areas beyond those
specifically conferred in Article 1, Section 8, of the U.S. Constitution and that the
treaty power is not subject to most Tenth Amendment limitations); see also Martin S.
Flaherty, Are We to Be a Nation? Federal Power vs. "States' Rights" in Foreign Affairs, 70 U.
COLO. L. REv. 1277, 1280 (1999) (arguing that the "federal foreign affairs authority
does and should trump the prohibition against the national government enlisting state
officials"); David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of
the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REv. 1075, 1314 (2000) ("[T]he
nationalist conception of the treaty power ... finds its ultimate justification in the
Founders' decision to lodge the whole of the foreign affairs powers exclusively. in the
national government.").
' "Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice of
[s]tates followed by them from a sense of legal obligation." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §102 (1986).
10 See, e.g., Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga's Firm Footing: International
Human Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 463, 529 (1997) ("[F1or
nearly twenty years, the federal government ... has spoken with one voice on the status
of [customary international law (CIL)] in U.S. law: [u]niversally-recognized human
rights are judicially-cognizable federal law."); Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in
the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1569 (1984) ("[T]he law of nations, which is
the responsibility of the U.S. nation, should be seen as incorporated in our national
jurisprudence as national (federal) law."); Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law
Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REv. 1824, 1824 (1998) ("[J]udicial determinations of
international law-including international human rights law-are matters of federal
law."); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary International Law: A Re-
sponse to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371, 376-77 (1997) ("In-
corporation at the federal level respects the national character of foreign relations:
the [s]tates are not entitled to adopt individual approaches to international law.");
Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary International Law as Federal Law After
Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 393, 397 (1997) (arguing that "the determination of the
content of customary international law and of whether or not it applies in a given
situation is a federal question, which triggers federal court jurisdiction and on which
federal court decisions are binding on the states").
1 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley &Jack L. Goldsmith, Ill, The Current Illegitimacy of In-
ternational Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319, 349 (1997) [hereinafter
Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy] (contending, based on the famous proclama-
tion in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938), that "[t] here is no federal
general common law," and that determinations of CIL are questions of state law which
"federal courts should not apply... as federal law without some authorization to do so
by the federal political branches"); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary
International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 816, 816-21 (1997) [hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique of the Modern
Position] (characterizing the traditional approach-which assumes CIL is a type of
federal common law-as a "modern position" that is inconsistent with federalism;
courts should not apply CIL as federal law unless authorized to do so by the federal
political branches); Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83
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different moments of political promise and despair, at times focused
on the immense power of the national project, and other times ap-
preciating the vitality and durability of forms of governance that,
without . . . great resources, continue to have social and political
force."1
2
Under both models, one system-either federal or subfederal-
has a predominant voice in deciding when and how international hu-
man rights law is implemented. Such either/or approaches seek to
avoid the conflict and indeterminacy created when the distribution of
constitutional authority is uncertain.13 At the traditional/hierarchical
end of the spectrum, the conflict is interference with the ability of the
nation to speak with "one voice" in foreign affairs, 4 posed by "diver-
gent and perhaps parochial state interpretations" of international
law.'5 At the revisionist/fragmentation end, the conflict, at its core, is
VA. L. REV. 1617, 1622 (1997) [hereinafter Goldsmith, Federal Courts] (arguing that the
federal common law of foreign relations as currently practiced by courts and
understood by scholars lacks justification); see also Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power
and American Federalism, 97 MICI. L. REV. 390, 394 (1998) [hereinafter Bradley, Treaty
Power] (arguing that the unlimited power of treaty makers over states is inconsistent
with American federalism).
1 Judith Resnik, Afterword: Federalism's Options, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 465, 500
(1996) (concluding a symposium on "Constructing a New Federalism: Jurisdictional
Competition and Competence").
See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 7, at 1047 ("Both paradigms create a sense
that conflict and indeterminacy are dysfunctional.").
14 See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 381 (2000) (em-
phasizing the need for the President to speak for the nation with one voice in dealing
with other governments); Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 508 n.4 (1988)
(finding "distinctive federal interest in ... the exterior relation of this whole nation
with other nations and governments" (internal quotation marks and citations omit-
ted));Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979) ("'In inter-
national relations and with respect to foreign intercourse and trade the people of the
United States act through a single government with unified and adequate national
power."' (quoting Bd. ofTrs. of Univ. of Ill. v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 59 (1933)));
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 437-38 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("[T]he con-
duct of our foreign affairs is entrusted under the Constitution to the National Gov-
ernment, not for local probate courts of the several states."); United States v. Belmont,
301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) ("Governmental power over external affairs is not distributed,
but is vested exclusively in the national government. And ... the Executive ha[s]
authority to speak as the sole organ of that government.").
15 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964). The Court
also stated that "ordering our relationships with other members of the international
community must be treated exclusively as an aspect of federal law." Id. Sabbatino relied
on an influential article by Professor (later International Court of Justice Judge)
Phillip C. Jessup, who argued that Justice Brandeis' famous pronouncement in Erie,
304 U.S. at 78, that "[tihere is no federal general common law," had (in Jessup's
words) "no direct application to international law." Philip C. Jessup, The Doctrine of
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to International Law, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 740, 741
[Vol. 150: 245
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interference with states' rights by federal courts (without authoriza-
tion to do so by the federal political branches) and by the political
branches (particularly Congress, when it exercises the treaty power to
legislate in areas beyond those specifically conferred in the U.S. Con-
stitution, Article 1, Section 8).' While the two paradigms described
here are idealized and oversimplify the subtlety and hybridity within
these paradigms, in fact much of the scholarship on federalism and
human rights law in the United States loosely tracks one or the other
of these two models, if not always in its purest form.
This Article argues for a third approach, premised on dialogue
and intergovernmental relations as a way to negotiate, rather than
avoid, conflict and indeterminacy." This approach links national and
subnational governments in a dialogue about rights by "creat[ing] ar-
eas of overlap in which neither system can claim total sovereignty.
' '
1
The dialogue emerges in these areas of overlap, particularly where dif-
ferences arise in the extent to which national and subnational gov-
ernments incorporate human rights obligations. Conflict and inde-
(1939). For more recent discussion of the same point, see Koh, supra note 10, at 1832,
arguing that designating state courts as the primary interpreters of CIL "would have
raised the specter that multiple variants of the same international law rule could pro-
liferate among the several states."
Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique of the Modern Position, supra note 11; Bradley &
Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy, supra note 11.
17 Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 7, at 1048 (proposing a model of federal-state
interaction and dialogue to address conflict and indeterminacy in the context of ha-
beas law). For discussion about the need for a new dynamic approach to federalism
generally, see, for example, MICHAEL D. REAGAN & JOHN G. SANZONE, THE NEW
FEDERALISM 3 (2d ed. 1981), stating: "Federalism-old style-is dead. Yet federal-
ism-new style-is alive and well and living in the United States. Its name is intergov-
ernmental relations." I view the third approach offered here as consistent with an
emerging body of scholarship on federalism and human rights law located along the
middle of the spectrum described above. This emerging body of scholarship includes,
for example, Judith Resnik, Categoical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111
YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2001) (arguing that we should be less categorical about alloca-
tion of authority between national and subnational governments); and PeterJ. Spiro,
The States and International Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 567, 568-69 (1997) (ar-
guing for direct liability for subnational entities-state and local governments--under
international law, as well as authority for these entities to "discreetly associate with
formal human rights regimes"). Aspects of scholarship that incline toward the tradi-
tional end of the spectrum indicate sympathy for the hybridity captured by the middle
of the spectrum. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 10, at 1858 (noting that a "zero-sum image
of state-federal competition leads Bradley and Goldsmith to downplay the multiple
channels through which international human rights norms trickle down to the states
from the federal government"). However, the approach outlined in this Article sug-
gests that these norms trickle up as well as down.
is Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 7, at 1048.
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terminacy are desired conditions, so long as mechanisms exist to
channel and resolve these differences and ambiguities, as a means of
clarifying and articulating international human rights domestically.
By contrast, where one system has sovereignty to act without the con-
sensus and support of the other, the reach of international human
rights law lacks both depth and breadth. Under the tradi-
tional/hierarchical model, human rights law lacks depth and con-
creteness because the democratic deficit inherent in the formation
and ratification of treaties 9 disables the federal government from
gaining support for human rights at the state and local level. Under
the revisionist/fragmentation model, human rights law lacks breadth
and national impact in the absence of some form of national coopera-
tion and coordination. By requiring intergovernmental cooperation
and dialogue, the third approach offered here facilitates the difficult
process of working out how to convert abstract international law prin-
ciples into concrete, workable domestic laws and policies with national
reach.
I call this arrangement "dialogic federalism" because it is based on
the assumption that dialogue among various levels of government is
critical to meaningful implementation of international human rights
law in the United States. 0 It also assumes that engagement in this in-
tergovernmental dialogue occurs hand in hand with dialogue between
and among various international, national, and subnational actors and
constituencies. Rather than facilitate mere transmission of the interna-
tional, then, this approach envisions a process of translation of interna-
tional to national.' 'Just as we know that translation from one lan-
guage to another requires more than literalness, we must recognize
the creativity, and therefore the uncertainty, involved in domestic in-
terpretation [of international law.] 22 After all, while translation owes
19 See infra notes 28, 92-94 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of public
access to and engagement in the treaty-making process).
21)I am grateful to Kendall Thomas, who identified the term "dialogic federalism"
in valuable comments he provided to me on an earlier draft of this Article. While
Cover and Aleinikoff, supra note 7, call the conceptual framework they developed in
the habeas context "dialectic federalism," I prefer the phrase "dialogic federalism" in
the context I address here, to stress the central importance of dialogue in implement-
ing international norms, the legitimacy of which is questioned prior to democratic
consideration and adoption of these norms.
21 See Karen IKnop, Here and There: International Law in Domestic Courts, 32 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 501, 504-05 (2000) (arguing that genuine domestic incorporation of
international law involves more than "a conveyor belt that delivers international law to
the people").
I2 d. at 506.
[Vol. 150:245
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fidelity to the other's language and text (the "other" here being inter-
national law), it also requires assertion of one's own language as well
("one's own" being domestic law). 23 "The ideal is thus neither wholly
international nor wholly national, but a hybrid that express[es] the
relationship between them. ' 4 The negotiation between international
and domestic legal regimes, and the hybridity which results, are the
driving forces behind translation of broad international principles
into concrete articulation of rights reflected domestically in law and
• 25
practice .
The translation metaphor is central to the model of dialogue envi-
sioned in this Article, because it captures the foreignness that many
Americans associate with international law. As a formal matter, rati-
fied treaties and customary international law are law of the land in the
United States.i As a practical matter, however, international law is of-
ten viewed as an alien source of law, lacking democratic legitimacy.• . 27
This latter view is reflected in Supreme Court jurisprudence. Trans-
lation from international to domestic law through broad-based demo-
cratic deliberation and discussion is necessary to address the demo-
cratic deficit inherent in the ways international law is implemented in
the United States. While particular democratic deficits characterize
lawmaking processes in the United States generally,2 this Article ar-
gues that the problem is aggravated in the making and implementa-
tion of international law because of lack of transparency in the inter-
national processes in which treaties are negotiated as well as in the
domestic processes by which treaties are ratified by the Senate, with-
out input from the House, unlike purely domestic legislation. By al-
lowing incorporation of international law through multiple points of
23 Id. (citing JAMES BOND WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN
CULTURAL AND LEGAL CRITICISM 264 (1990)).
24 Id.
25 Cf id. (citing Homi K. Bhabha, The Commitment to Theoy, NEW FORMATIONS,
Summer 1988, at 5, 22 (stating "that it is the 'inter'-the cutting edge of translation
and negotiation" that opens a space in which "we will find those words with which we
can speak of Ourselves and Others")).
For discussion see infra notes 49-50, 52 and accompanying text.
27 For discussion see infra notes 51, 53 and accompanying text.
28 See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC
CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 12 (1997) ("[T]he message [of public choice litera-
ture] is... about why political markets cannot work to satisfy the democratic wish, that
is, to provide the people with the government that they want."); Koh, supra note 10, at
1854 (describing domestic federal legislation as "a process notoriously dominated by
committees, strong-willed individuals, collective action problems, and private rent-
seeking").
2001]
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entry, dialogic federalism facilitates translation at various sites with
broader participation, ensuring thicker, more complex understand-
ings of human rights law.
This dialogic approach is both descriptive and prescriptive. It is
descriptive in that it theorizes by looking at existing intergovernmen-
tal collaboration and dialogue. Dialogic federalism is also prescriptive
in that it encourages state and local participation even where none ex-
ists and posits a constitutional analysis about this participation. The
constitutional analysis draws inspiration from scholarship on demo-
cratic experimentalism, a theory of American constitutionalism that
reinterprets democratic deliberation as a means of reducing the dis-
2')tance between two visions of the Constitution . One vision rests on
the Madisonian ideal of limited government based on complex divi-
sions of powers.3 " The other rests on the New Deal synthesis involving
an all-powerful Congress that delegates much of its authority to expert
agencies, which are presumably checked through judicial oversight
when rights are violated.)' Dialogic federalism extends this theory by
investigating new modes of democratic deliberation in the context of
domestic implementation of international human rights law. In the
international human rights context, these new modes of democratic
deliberation must resolve the tension between the Madisonian proj-
ect's commitment to decentralizing authority32 and the fact that the
Constitution created national institutions "precisely to avoid such bal-
kanization of foreign policy and international affairs.""M
29 See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimental-
ism, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 267, 289 (1998) (conceiving of a new decentralized vision of
government, "democratic experimentalism," through which the federal government
partners with state and local governments to facilitate more participatory and demo-
cratic modes of lawmaking).
3O Id. at 289.
31 Id. at 290-91.
:32 Doff and Sabel assert:
Madison's understanding of the crucial role of power allocation led him to be-
lieve that "[t] he end of constitutional (as opposed to statutory] interpretation
was to determine which branch or level of government possessed the right to
act in a particular area of governance, and in doing so, to preserve the equi-
librium among institutions that the Constitution intended to establish."
Id. at 289 n.66 (quotingJACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN
THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 345 (1996)).
33 Koh, supra note 10, at 1841. In fact Madison was aware of this very need for na-
tional institutions. See id. at 1825 n.4 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 264 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961), and indicating that "[b]oth Edmund Randolph
and James Madison complained at the Constitutional Convention about the Constitu-
tional Congress's inability to give effect to the law of nations under the Articles of Con-
[Vol. 150: 245
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As a constitutional thesis, dialogic federalism reveals what both
the traditional/hierarchical and revisionist/fragmentation models fail
to fully capture and offers a normative framework for negotiating
(rather than avoiding) the conflict and indeterminacy inherent in
overlapping jurisdiction between national and subnational govern-
ments. While these other models anticipate overlapping jurisdiction,3 4
both seek to avoid possible conflicts through trumps: federal suprem-
acy at one end of the spectrum, and states' rights at the other. By con-
trast, dialogic federalism embraces conflict and utilizes it productively
through reliance on dialogue, coordination, and negotiation, rather
than trumps. By advancing a more consensus-based process that de-
pends on multiple and concurrent levels of deliberation, this ap-
proach seeks to address shortcomings inherent in both federally-
imposed mandates (which often fail to gain support at the state and
local level) 35 and fragmented state and local initiatives (which often
fail to translate into full-scale national compliance with international
human rights laws absent coordination and dialogue).
In offering a preliminary sketch of dialogic federalism, this Article
is a first step in a larger theoretical project concerning a core dilemma
confronting the human rights project: how to square the idea of uni-
versal international standards with the tendency toward localism and• 36
particularity. Often asserted as a reaction to globalization, regional
integration, and harmonization, localism (or, in the European con-
text, "subsidiarity") resists homogenization and seeks to protect diver-
sity and difference among national and subnational systems. Local-
ism, therefore, asserts that decision making should be on the lowest
possible level, and involve individuals, as opposed to their representa-
tives, to the greatest extent possible. The initial conclusion which is
introduced here, but which clearly requires further development, is
that a federated society such as the United States (or the European
Union) will be better equipped to resolve these tensions by develop-
ing methods of democratic deliberation that bridge, on the one hand,
the society's structural permeability to international human rights
federation").
34 For example, these competing paradigms anticipate both federal and state
courts havingjurisdiction (though not always concurrently) over CIL.
35 The backlash against affirmative action, busing, and other federally-imposed
civil rights remedies might be read as a failure of top-down approaches, absent efforts
to gain support at the state and local level.
I have explored a related clash between universality and cultural relativism in
Catherine Powell, Locating Culture, Identity and Human Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REv. 201 (1999).
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norms through multiple points of entry with, on the other hand, the
coordination and extraction of these norms at the national level.
This Article questions the efficiency of enabling fifty different leg-
islative campaigns to promote human rights standards, rather than
one. By the same token, this piece asks whether there can be any
shortcuts. 7 While I do not have any empirical evidence at this stage of
my project to suggest whether or not state and local processes are more
open to individuals who wish to engage in standard setting, my argu-
ment is simply that "localizing" international human rights law creates
opportunities for standard setting that supplement, solidify, and
deepen opportunities at the federal level."
Even assuming that the federal government undertook greater
leadership in ratifying additional human rights treaties, in more fully
implementing those it has not ratified, or in withdrawing reservations
to treaty provisions, the argument here is that there would still be a
value in state and local participation. By enabling democratic delib-
eration at multiple levels, dialogic federalism facilitates a broader and
deeper consensus over human rights commitments. At the same time,
this approach depends on some form of coordination at the federal
level, either by the federal government, a national network of state
and local governments, or a national nongovernmental structure. Be-
cause this paradigm relies on state and local government adoption of
human rights standards as a supplement or enhancement to (not as a
replacement or diminution of) the role of the federal government, it
contrasts with the position taken by revisionist international law schol-
ars. In arguing that the federal government's ability to implement,
interpret, and enforce international law should be limited on grounds
of federalism and separation of powers, these scholars would disable,
rather than bolster, federal authority."z:
Part I of this Article describes current challenges, in which the
37 I would like to acknowledge Eyal Benvenisti for raising these important ques-
tions in helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
3 Cf Mark Tushnet, Keeping Your Eye on the Ball: The Significance of the Revival of
Constitutional Federalism, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 1065, 1069-71 (1997) (suggesting that
enabling links between subnational governments and transnational networks might be
a wa of reducing the democratic deficit in American politics).
See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique of the Modem Position, supra note 11, at 870
("We have argued that, in the absence of federal political branch authorization, [CIL]
is not a source of federal law."); Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy, supra note
11, at 368-69 ("[T] he ... view that the new CIL is automatically incorporated into fed-
eral common law is inconsistent with fundamental constitutional values .... [C]urrent
federal statutes do not support incorporation of substantive rules of the new CIL of
human rights.").
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public is largely disengaged from the primary processes through
which human rights law is incorporated by the federal government,
because these processes discourage direct, broad-based deliberation of
subject matter viewed as highly technical and not immediately appli-
cable to people's daily lives. Part II investigates dialogic federalism as
a possible solution. Part III describes three different types of dialogic
federalism and provides case studies illustrating the first and most fre-
quent form in which state and local governments adopt international
human rights standards where the federal government has failed to
ratify a treaty. Part IV of this Article locates dialogic federalism within
the context of other scholarship on domestic incorporation of inter-
national law in the United States and points to its contribution as an
alternate framework.
I. CURRENT CHALLENGES
In other areas of law, scholars applaud what they describe as new
forms of governance, in which power is decentralized away from the
national government to enable citizens and other actors to utilize lo-
cal knowledge in crafting solutions that more tightly fit local circum-
40stances. Yet, in the realm of international law, the predominant view
is that the federal government has a virtual monopoly in foreign af-
fairs and in the development of the two main sources of public inter-
national law-treaties and customary international law.4' This view
(represented in the traditional/hierarchical model described above)
is overwhelmingly supported by the Framers' vision of the nation, 41 the
40 See, e.g., Dorf & Sabel, supra note 29 (describing role for state and local govern-
ments to work in partnership with the federal government to facilitate participatory
and democratic approaches to lawmaking).
41 But see infra Part IV for discussion of opposing views of revisionist scholars.
42 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) ("[T]he peace of the WHOLE ought not to be left at the disposal of a
PART. The Union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct
of its members."); THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 264 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) ("If we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect
to other nations."); Henkin, supra note 10, at 1559 n.19 (quoting 2 THE FEDERALIST
No. 42, at 50 (James Madison) (New York, 1788)), in which James Madison 'justified
the clause in the Constitution giving authority to Congress to define offenses against
the law of nations and criticized the absence of such authorization in the Articles of
Confederation, which 'consequently [left] it in the power of any indiscreet member
[i.e., state] to embroil the confederacy with other nations"'); id. at 1560 n.22 (quoting
2 THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 305 (Alexander Hamilton) (New York, 1788), in which
"Alexander Hamilton cites 'cases arising upon treaties and the laws of nations' as
proper for the jurisdiction of federal courts").
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Constitution," international law,44 and Supreme Court precedent re-
flecting constitutional and policy considerations regarding the need
for the nation to speak with "one voice" in foreign affairs.4 "Every
schoolchild knows that the failures of the Articles of Confederation
led to the framing of the Constitution, which established national
governmental institutions to articulate uniform positions on such
uniquely federal matters as foreign affairs and international law.
'46
However, these institutions-federal courts (in the context of litiga-
tion based on customary international law or treaty claims) and the
Senate and executive branch (in the treaty-making context)-dis-
courage direct broad-based participation. The relative absence of
public engagement in these institutions contributes to the failure of
these institutions to translate fully international law into domestic law.
For a discussion of additional historical evidence, see FREDERICK W. MARKS III,
INDEPENDENCE ON TRIAL: FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION
200-06 (2d ed., Scholarly Res. Inc. 1986) (1973), explaining the significance of foreign
affairs in the creation of the Constitution, and the Framers' view of a strong central
government; and Flaherty, supra note 8, at 1309-15, noting the Founders' commitment
to nationalism in the realm of foreign affairs.
43 Compare U.S. CONST. art. 1I, § 2, cl. 2 (stating that the President has power, "with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the
Senators present concur"), and id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (authorizing a national institu-
tion, Congress, "[tlo define and punish ... Offenses against the Law of Nations"), with
id. at art. I, § 10, cls. 1-2 (banning states from making treaties, alliances, agreements, or
compacts with foreign powers without the consent of Congress; prohibiting states from
engaging in war unless actually invaded; and forbidding them from laying imposts or
duties on imports or exports without the consent of Congress).
44 Jessup, supra note 15, at 741-43 (noting that the several states of the Union are
entities unknown to international law). But see infra notes 207, 210 and accompanying
text (discussing the limited ways in which subnational governments in the United
States and Germany have participated in international agreements and regional ar-
rangements).
5 See supra notes 14-15 (citing examples of Supreme Court opinions supporting
the "one voice" approach to foreign affairs); see also United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203,
232 (1942) ("If state action could defeat or alter our foreign policy, serious conse-
quences might ensue. The nation as a whole would be held to answer if a [s]tate cre-
ated difficulties with a foreign power.").
46 Koh, supra note 10, at 1825; see also id. at 1825 n.4 (citing complaints by "[bloth
Edmund Randolph andJames Madison ... at the Constitutional Convention about the
Continental Congress's inability to give effect to the law of nations under the Articles
of Confederation"); MARKS, supra note 42, at 145 ("The lesson was clear: there was
need for a strong national executive, and such an office would prove effective.");
RAKOVE, supra note 32, at 29 ("[A]s most proposals to amend the Articles sought to
free Congress from its debilitating dependence on the states, the agenda of national
reform seemed designed to reduce rather than strengthen the connections between
state and national politics."); 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at
24-25, 316-17 (Max Farrand ed., 1966) (noting the inability of the Articles of Confed-
eration to control State relations with foreign nations).
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In the judicial context, while some judges in the United States are
deeply engaged with international law, most judges are reluctant to
apply these norms.48 This is the case even though ratified human
rights treaties and customary international law are both law of the
land in the United States.4' Under the Supremacy Clause, the law of
the land is binding on the federal governments as well as on state and
local governments: Even so, some judges dismiss the relevance of in-
ternational law claims or are openly hostile to them."" While ratified
47 See, e.g., Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615 (4th Cir. 1998) (affirming district court's
denial of federal habeas relief to petitioner raising procedurally barred Vienna Con-
vention claim), cert. denied sub nom., Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 380 (1998)(Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (finding foreign national's argument
for stay of execution not wholly without merit where the United States submitted an
amicus brief acknowledging that the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, done
Apr. 24, 1963, art. 42, 21 U.S.T. 77, 104, 596 U.N.T.S. 261, 296, had been violated be-
cause the foreign national was not notified of his right to communicate with his consu-
late); Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt, Fifty-First Cardozo Memorial Lec-
ture: Affirmative Action: An International Human Rights Dialogue, 21 CARDOZO L. REV.
253, 281-82 (1999) (reflecting Justice Ginsburg's awareness of the relevance of interna-
tional human rights law domestically); see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,
830-31 (1988) (Stevens, J.) (relying on the laws of other nations in interpreting the
Eighth Amendment in ajuvenile death penalty case involving a fifteen-year-old); MARY
L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS 90-102 (2000) (highlighting evidence that in the
195 0 s, the Supreme Court may have been swayed by arguments in the Justice Depart-
ment's briefs indicating that segregation threatened the role of the United States as a
global leader for democracy).
48 See Eyal Benvenisti, Judicial Misgivings Regarding the Application of International
Law: An Analysis of Attitudes of National Courts, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 159, 160-75 (1993)(discussing reasons that prompt most national courts to approach international norms
apprehensively and limit their application within national legal systems).
49 Henkin, supra note 10, at 1565; see also In re Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700
(1900) ("International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and adminis-
tered by the courts.., as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly pre-
sented for their determination.").
50 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land .... ).
51 See, e.g., Greene, 523 U.S. at 374 (denying certiorari and motion for stay of execu-
tion in spite of an International Court ofJustice opinion granting a provisional order
in a case alleging a violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations); Fed-
eral Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111, 111-12 (1999) (same); Thomp-
son, 487 U.S. at 869 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that laws of other nations have
little relevance to interpreting Eighth Amendment standards of cruel and unusual
punishment in the context of executions of fifteen-year-olds, stating that "it is a Consti-
tution for the United States of America that we are expounding"); see also Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989) (Scalia,J.) (rejecting the relevance of the law
of other nations in interpreting the Eighth Amendment in a juvenile death penalty
case involving sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds and stating that "[w]e emphasize that it
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treaties and customary international law are "our law,",5 some mem-
bers of the Supreme Court view international human rights law as an
offshore body of law-an alien set of norms that exists out "there,"
overseas, but have little relevance "here," in the United States.
5 3 Miss-
ing from this approach is recognition of how international law got
"there," as well as the role Americans played in putting it "there.
A further constraint in the judicial context is the fact that the
United States has neither ratified several of the major human rights
treaties, 5 nor fully implemented treaties that it has ratified. Having
declared most human rights treaties it ratifies to be non-self-
executing, the United States has limited the enforceability of these
treaties absent implementing legislation.5' By not enacting implemen-
is American conceptions of decency that are dispositive").
52 Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.
53 See Knop, supra note 21, at 522-23 (using the "here" and "there" distinction to
demonstrate the perceived distance between national and international law); see also
Louis HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 157-78 (1989) (using the "here" and "there" dis-
tinction to demonstrate the perceived distance between U.S. law and the law of other
countries). Compare supra note 47 (citing cases in which Supreme Court Justices rec-
ognized the relevance of international law to interpreting U.S. constitutional claims),
with supra note 51 (citing cases in which Supreme CourtJustices failed to recognize the
relevance of international law in interpreting U.S. constitutional claims).
54 For discussions of the role Americans played in developing and sustaining the
international human rights framework, see MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW:
ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2001);
and President Roosevelt's "Four Freedoms" speech, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Annual
Message to Congress (Jan. 6, 1941), in 9 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, 1940, at 663 (1941), which paved the way for critical con-
cepts in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See also HENKIN, supra note 53, at
156 ("American constitutionalism can proudly claim an important part in the devel-
opment of international human rights, and in their dissemination to every continent
and corner."); Oscar Schacter, International Law Implications of U.S. Human Rights Poli-
cies, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63, 66-69 (1978) (discussing how the United States has
given impetus to recognition of core human rights as international legal obligations
even in the absence of human rights treaties).
55 For example, the United States has signed but not ratified, inter alia, CEDAW,
supra note 3; Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989,
1577 U.N.T.S. 44; and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, S. EXEC. DOC. D, 95-2, at 13,993 U.N.T.S. 4.
Debates regarding the validity and impact of non-self-executing declarations
remain. Compare LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 201-02 (2d ed. 1996) (arguing that the use of non-self-executing decla-
rations is "'anti-Constitutional' in spirit and highly problematic as a matter of law"),
Lori F. Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning "Self-Executing" and "Non-
Self-Executing" Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENTL. REV. 515, 532 (1991) (questioning whether non-
self-executing declarations have either domestic or international effect), Martin S. Fla-
herty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties as "Su-
preme Law of the Land", 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095, 2097-99 (1999) (supporting the doc-
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tating legislation where existing measures are absent and by not tak-
ing other steps to achieve the substantive rights in ratified treaties, the
United States fails to follow through on international obligations that
require treaty signatories to implement these instruments through
legislation and other measures."
The reluctance and open hostility some federal courts express to-
ward international law claims reflect ambivalence toward the legiti-
macy of international law as a source of law. While expert organiza-
tions such as Amnesty and Human Rights Watch (along with a small
handful of law school-based human rights clinics) file amicus briefs
introducing courts to these claims, most courts refuse to view interna-
tional law claims as relevant to the resolution of specific cases. Be-
cause international law is not claimed by the American people as "our
law," some judges argue that we can legitimately ignore it. By con-
trast, if Americans adopted international standards as their standards,
then an analysis of international law would indeed be relevant to de-
termining, for example, "evolving standards of decency" in the con-
text of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment:"' While adoption of international law as "our law" rarely
trine of self-executing declarations in response to John Yoo), and Carlos Manuel Vaz-
quez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L. L. 695, 700-22 (1995)
(identifying four legitimate reasons for concluding that a treaty is non-self-executing),
with John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the
Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1955, 1961-62(1999) [hereinafter Yoo,
Globalism and the Constitution] (challenging the view that the Founders intended trea-
ties to be self-executing), andJohn C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and
Structural Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 2218, 2221-33 (1999)
[hereinafter Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking] (replying to Flaherty's response to
Yoo's earlier article defending non-self-execution).
57 See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 5, at art. 2, para. 2, S. EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2, at 24, 999
U.N.T.S. at 173-74 ("[E]ach State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the
necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions
of the present Covenant, to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be neces-
sary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant."); id. at art. 2, para.
3, S. EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2, at 24, 999 U.N.T.S. at 173-74 ("Each State Party to the present
Covenant undertakes: (a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as
herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy .. "); see also Conven-
tion Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, arts. 4-5, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20, at 20,
1465 U.N.T.S. 113, 114 (using similar language, but including requirement that each
State Party "ensure that all acts of torture are offences under its criminal law").
58 Compare Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 & n.1 (1989) (Scalia, J.) (find-
ing that the laws of other nations have little relevance to interpreting the Eighth
Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment in the context of execu-
tions of people who were sixteen or seventeen years old at the time of the offense be-
cause "it is American conceptions of decency that are dispositive"), with Thompson v.
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occurs in federal courtrooms, outside the courtroom international
human rights law is increasingly shaping debates at the state and local
levels in the context of the death penalty.
In the legislative and executive branches of government, the cur-
rent practice of adopting treaties involves what I call a "black box" ap-
proach whose reliance on technical expertise in human rights allows,
at best, modest engagement by members of the citizenry beyond
Washington-based, inside-the-beltway nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) .59 By short-circuiting broad-based deliberation, this "black
box" approach allows "transmittal of the international," not a full
"process of translation from international to national."', Because of
the federal government's failure to engage in this process of transla-
tion-in its neglect of international law as either an interpretive tool or
as binding law-most Americans see international human rights law as
an irrelevant offshore body of law. This Article argues that a more
complete drawing down of international law depends on the devel-
opment of more participatory mechanisms through which Americans
can foster a deeper human rights culture.U7 By cultivating and ampli-
fying the voices of state and local governments in the adoption and
implementation of human rights, dialogic federalism assists in widen-
ing the base of support for and increasing the legitimacy of these
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-31 (1988) (Stevens, J.) (finding that the laws of other na-
tions were relevant in interpreting the Eighth Amendment in a case concerning the
execution of a person who was fifteen years old at the time the offense was commit-
ted).
59 Cf Oliver Gerstenberg & Charles F. Sabel, Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy: An Insti-
tutional Ideal far Europe?, at 2, at http://www.law.columbia.edu/sabel/papers.htm (last
visited Nov. 26, 2001) (discussing how a similar dynamic is at work in the European
Union, where "the sheer complexity [of the emerging system] and especially its reli-
ance on technocratic deliberation, renders implausible even the most modest assump-
tion of effective political oversight by an informed citizenry").
Knop, supra note 21, at 505 (emphasis added).
Cf Dorothy Q. Thomas, Advancing Rights Protection in the United States: An Inter-
nationalized Advocacy Strategy, 9 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 15, 19 (1996) (describing evidence
that "domestic rights groups in the United States have become less, rather than more,
internationalized in their advocacy approach," and attributing this to "the U.S. gov-
ernment's longstanding determination to insulate the national legal system from the
influence of international law").
12 Karen Knop refers to this sentiment as Vilkerrechtsfreundlich-"friendly to inter-
national law." Knop, supra note 21, at 502 (using this term loosely and citing, for the
more technical meaning, Brunno Simma et al., The Role of German Courts in the Enforce-
ment of International Human Rights, in ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN
DOMESTIC COURTS 71, 94-96 (Benedetto Conforti & Francesco Francioni eds., 1997)).
Of course, there is a chicken-and-egg problem here in that dialogic federalism both
creates and requires a deeper human rights culture.
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norms.
Rather than mobilize support for meaningful ratification of these
treaties by convincing the public that treaty commitments will make a
difference in their lives, the Washington-based NGO insiders reassure
lawmakers that adoption of human rights treaties will not fundamen-
tally disturb existing domestic law commitments. These reassurances
become self-fulfilling in that lawmakers attach a range of conditions
known as reservations, understandings, and declarations (RUDs) to
treaties to ensure that their impact is limited.64 RUDs, in turn, rein-
force the lack of domestic constituent support for treaties adopted by
stealth within the black box, since there appears to be little value
added. However, without such conditions attached, human rights
treaties could dramatically expand protections for disenfranchised in-
dividuals.65 These stealth treaties slip silently into law, encumbered
with RUDs that water down their domestic impact. Not surprisingly,
the perception that follows is that these treaties are ineffective, dead
letters of the law, ensuring continued apathy for the human rights
norms that these treaties convey.
63 Of course, broadening participation in the deliberation and implementation of
human rights law does not necessarily ensure that the public will accept these norms.
After all, knowledge does not equal acceptance. However, this Article argues that it is
better to have fewer international human rights norms incorporated into domestic law
that enjoy broader support and legitimacy than to have many international norms
formally incorporated that lack de facto legitimacy.
M These RUDs frequently include, for example, a boiler-plate declaration pro-
nouncing that a treaty is non-self-executing, as described above. For further discussion
of RUDs, see Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of
Senator Bricker, 89 AM.J. INT'L L. 341, 349 (1995), explaining that U.S. RUDs upholding
federalist ideals limit the impact of treaties and agreements; and Curtis A. Bradley &
Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
399, 419 (2000), explaining that non-self-executing "declarations are designed to pre-
clude the treaties from being enforceable in U.S. courts in the absence of implemem-
ing legislation."
65 Even with RUDs, including non-self-executing declarations, treaties may provide
some value. See Martha F. Davis, International Human Rights and United States Law:
Predictions of a Courtwatcher, 64 ALB. L. REV. 417, 428-36 (2000) (demonstrating the
value of international human rights law as interpretive tool); Connie de la Vega, Civil
Rights During the 1990s: New Treaty Law Could Help Immensely, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 423,
467-70 (1997) (proposing that government entities can use non-self-executing treaties
to defend programs that protect or promote the human rights goals of the treaties); see
also Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (offering a
canon of statutory construction that directs that "an act of [C]ongress ought never to
be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains");
Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon of Domestic Statutory
Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103 (1990) (suggesting ways to use the Charming Betsy
principle as an interpretive tool).
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Scholars who follow the revisionist/fragmentation model may ar-
gue that RUDs represent resistance by domestic constituencies to ef-
forts by international elites that would disrupt local practices, and that
in this sense, RUDs reflect democracy at work. In fact, this is what
Senator Bricker and other segregationists argued for in trying to limit
the reach of the treaty power in the 1950s. 66 However, there is no evi-
dence today that RUDs mark an attempt to preserve local practices.
Because ratification occurs with the advice and consent of the Senate,
and not the House, it is hard to argue that RUDs truly reflect local
practices.
Rather, the adoption and compliance of human rights treaties by
stealth paves the way for limited and cramped incorporation of inter-
national protections with conditions that restrict the reach of these in-
struments. Stealth treaties are also troubling because they result in
the average person on the street having little to no knowledge of the
international human rights protections to which she is entitled.
Clearly there is a paradox if the only way to ensure that the executive
branch and Senate adopt treaties is by stealth, which in turn ensures
that treaties are ineffective, dead letters of the law.
II. DIALOGIC FEDERALISM
To move beyond these challenges, this Article proposes dialogic
federalism as a possible solution. Rather than embrace zero-sum un-
derstandings of the respective roles of federal and nonfederal systems,
a dialogic approach depends on cooperation between these systems to
translate broad international law principles into concrete domestic
laws and policies. Borrowing insights from both the revision-
ist/fragmentation and traditional/hierarchical models described
above, dialogic federalism seeks to both (1) deepen the democratic
legitimacy of international human rights laws through state and local
innovation in implementing these laws, and (2) broaden forms of na-
tional coordination of this innovation.
Achieving these twin goals involves bridging the two visions of the
Constitution alluded to above:67 its commitment to complex divisions
of powers (in accord with its Madisonian inspiration) on the one
hand, and its stake in national institutions designed to address the in-
66 See NATALIE HEVENER KAUFMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AND THE SENATE: A
HISTORY OF OPPOSITION 99-100, 108-10 (1990) (describing how the Bricker Amend-
ment would have protected states' rights in the context of treaty ratification).
67 Supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
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ability of the Continental Congress to give effect to the law of nations
under the Articles of Confederation, on the other hand. The latter
vision was bolstered by federal initiatives of the New Deal and civil
rights eras. By arguing for ways to afford citizens and other actors
greater participation in using local knowledge to craft solutions that fit
the particular circumstances of their communities, democratic ex-
perimentalists have tried to theorize new forms of governance that ac-
commodate the essence of these two visions. The tension between
these two visions is reflected in the society's erratic jurisprudence on
federalism, which prohibits Congress from commandeering states
even while it permits Congress to deeply influence state lawmaking
through constitutional spending powers and conditional preemp-
tion. 6' Democratic experimentalists propose to resolve this dilemma
by enabling state and local governments to partner with (rather than
replace) federal government in more meaningful ways by facilitating
more participatory and democratic modes of lawmaking.
Similarly, dialogic federalism envisions intergovernmental coop-
eration and dialogue as a means of addressing this constitutional co-
nundrum and democratizing the implementation of human rights law
in the United States. This approach "reinterprets democratic delib-
eration to advance the Madisonian project of using the institutions of
government itself to foster practical cooperation. '"70 It is in this spirit
that a dialogic approach is offered "not as an alternative to the Ameri-
can constitutional tradition but as an interpretation of it."7' As an in-
terpretation of this tradition, dialogic federalism acknowledges the
federal government's foreign affairs role provided under the U.S.
Constitution and anticipated by international law. This model also
recognizes the risk of "multiple variants of the same international law
rule 7 3 that the establishment of a national constitution was designed
to avoid.
However, the rationale behind the need for the nation to speak
68 See, e.g., Doff & Sabel, supra note 29, at 314, 316-23 (presenting the basic fea-
tures of a "subnational, pragmatist government").
69 See id. at 419-28 ("[T]he Supreme Court oscillates.., between revisionary reviv-
als of the distinction [between federal and state powers] and weary criticism of the re-
vision.").
70 d. at 289.
71 Id.
72 See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text (describing authority for the fed-
eral government's role under the U.S. Constitution and international law, respec-
tively). n
3. Koh, supra note 10, at 1832.
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with "one voice" through the President with respect to other coun-
tries-that is, to avoid sending contradictory signals regarding U.S. re-
lations with other countries=--loses its bite in the context of domestic
incorporation of international human rights law. In the foreign af-
fairs context, contradictory signals may be sent if, for example, a state
or local government imposes sanctions on a foreign country that are
inconsistent with federal policy toward that country. Thus, in Crosby v.
National Foreign Trade Council, the Supreme Court held that a Massa-
chusetts sanctions law regarding Burma was preempted by federal leg-
islation directing the President to develop "a comprehensive, multi-
lateral strategy to bring democracy to and improve human rights
practices and the quality of life in Burma.",7 In the context of domes-
tic incorporation of international human rights law, the risk of send-
ing contradicting signals in U.S. relations with other countries is sig-
nificantly less. Yet, a subnational approach to domestic incorporation
of human fights may lead to the development of "divergent and per-
haps parochial state interpretations,, 7 1 of international standards,
77which the Founders sought to avoid. Moreover, since the parameters
of foreign and domestic are often intermingled, there is an outside
chance that such pronouncements could affect U.S. relations with
other countries in ways that would obscure "the President's power to
speak and bargain effectively with other nations., 7' A possible way to
74 For a classic statement of the rationale behind the "one-voice" principle, see
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 381 (2000), stating, "[t]he Presi-
dent's maximum power to persuade [in foreign affairs] rests on his capacity to bargain
for the benefits of access to the entire national economy without exception for en-
claves fenced off willy-nilly by inconsistent political tactics." Id.
75 Id. at 369 (quoting Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, § 570(c), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-166 (1997)).
76 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964).
77 See supra note 42 (discussing the Founders' opinions about American foreign
polic ,).
Cf INDERPAL GREWAL & CAREN KAPLAN, INTRODUCTION TO SCATTERED
HEGEMONIES: POSTMODERNITY AND TRANSNATIONAL FEMINIST PRACTICES 10-13 (n-
derpal Grewal & Caren Kaplan eds., 1994) (discussing blurring of the line between
global and local).
79 Crosby, 530 U.S. at 382. For example, a state government's narrow interpreta-
tion of the scope of international law obligations in the death penalty context can im-
plicate and has implicated the nation's relations with other countries. See, e.g., La-
Grand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 L.C.J. No. 104 (June 27) (holding that Arizona failed
to notify two German nationals facing the death penalty of their rights under the Vi-
enna Convention on Consular Relations, which requires notifying an arrested or de-
tained foreign national of his right to consult with a consular official, in a case brought
by Germany against the United States to challenge the death sentences), available at
http://www.icj-cji.org; Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
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limit this risk is by preempting state and local government attempts to
convert their incorporation of international human rights laws into
pronouncements of international law. Under this approach these
state and local enactments would operate as nothing more than state
and local law, adopted pursuant to authority that clearly exists at the
subnational level.
In fact, enabling state and local governments to partner with the
federal government in incorporation of human rights law may convert
weakly-legitimated norms developed at the international level into
norms that are more strongly legitimated at a local level. By bringing
human rights lawmaking closer to the people whose rights are af-
fected, a dialogic federalist approach has the added benefit of democ-
ratizing the implementation of international law norms. Further-
more, incentivizing state and local governments to experiment with
the direct incorporation of human rights law would address, to a large
extent, the federalism concerns raised in the context of federal incor-
poration of norms perceived as falling within areas traditionally rele-
gated to states such as family law and criminal law.s°
These federalism concerns are raised even though, according to
the Supreme Court in Missouri v. Holland, the treaty power authorizes
Congress to legislate under the Necessary and Proper Clause"' in areas
beyond those specifically conferred on Congress by Article I, Section 8
of the Constitution, and the treaty power is not subject to most Tenth
Amendment limitations.80 The proposed Bricker Amendment in the
1950s would have formally limited the treaty power to the extent it ex-
(Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. No. 99 (Nov. 10) (holding that because the state of Virginia
failed to notify a Paraguayan national facing the death penalty of his right to consult a
consular official, the United States violated the Vienna Convention on Consular Rela-
tions, in a case brought by Paraguay against the United States to challenge the death
sentence), available at http://www.icj-cji.org.
80 But see Dorf & Sabel, supra note 29, at 419-28 (suggesting that the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence on federalism is misguided); Resnik, supra note 17 (manuscript
at 3) (arguing that we need to be less categorical about what we view as "truly local"
and "truly national"); Reva Siegel, She, the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality,
Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2002) (arguing that the
Nineteenth Amendment could be read as subverting traditional understandings of
famil , women's roles in the family, gender equality, and federalism).
8 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18.
82 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920) ("No doubt the great body of private relations usually
fall within the control of [a] [s]tate, but a treaty may override its power."). While Mis-
souri v. Holland holds that most Tenth Amendment limitations do not apply to the
treaty power, it is less clear whether the anticommandeering doctrine, which prohibits
Congress from conscripting state legislators or officers to enforce federal law, applies
to the treat), power.
2001]
266 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
tends congressional authority beyond the constraints of federalism."'
Despite the 1954 defeat of the Bricker Amendment, the current prac-
tice by the Senate and executive branch of attaching federalism un-
derstandings84 and other conditions to treaties during the ratification
process achieves the same result. Arguably, a federalism understand-
ing "'serve [s] no legal purpose,"' because "such a declaration of intent
does not decrease the United States' international obligations and
does not decrease in the slightest the power of Congress to implement
those obligations."8.. However, in light of the Supreme Court's new
8 See KAUFMAN, supra note 66, at 99-100, 108-10 (describing how the Bricker
Amendment would have protected states' rights in the context of treaty ratification).
84 For example, see the U.S. RUDs to the ICCPR:
That the United States understands that this Covenant shall be implemented
by the Federal Government to the extent that it exercises legislative and judi-
cial jurisdiction over the matters covered therein, and otherwise by the state
and local governments; to the extent that state and local governments exer-
cise jurisdiction over such matters, the Federal Government shall take meas-
ures appropriate to the Federal system to the end that the competent authori-
ties of the state or local governments may take appropriate measures for the
full fulfillment of the Covenant.
U.S. RUDs to the ICCPR, supra note 5, at 8071.
Professor Gerald Neuman observes, "The legislative history explains that an un-
derstanding rather than a reservation was employed, because 'the intent is not to mod-
ify or limit U.S. undertakings under the Covenant but rather to put our future treaty
partners on notice with regard to the implications of our federal system concerning
implementation."' Gerald L. Neuman, The Global Dimension of RFRA, 14 CONST.
COMMENT. 33, 51-52 (1997) (quoting S. EXEc. REP. NO. 102-23, at 18 (1992) (reprint-
ing the George H.W. Bush administration's explanation)).
While a federalism understanding represents a fairly explicit demonstration of
federalism concerns, a more implicit way the U.S. expresses these concerns is by enter-
ing a reservation on a treaty provision concerning a right that traditionally falls within
the ambit of state regulation. See, e.g., U.S. RUDs to the ICCPR, supra note 5, at 8070
(providing a U.S. reservation on the provision prohibiting the juvenile death penalty).
85 See DUANE TANANBAUM, THE BRICKER AMENDMENT CONTROVERSY: A TEST OF
EISENHOWER'S POLITIcAL LEADERSHIP 89 (1988) (discussing Eisenhower's promise to
exercise treaty-making power only within "traditional limits," consistent with the
Bricker Amendment); Henkin, supra note 64, at 349 (explaining that the Senate and
executive branch's current practice of attaching RUDs to treaties achieves the goal
Senator Bricker sought).
86 Neuman, supra note 84, at 52 (quoting Henkin, supra note 64, at 346). Note
that Professor Neuman is making two distinct points here regarding the impact of a
federalism understanding: one international and the other domestic. The first point
concerns the impact on the United States' international obligations, while the second
concerns the impact on its domestic authority to implement those obligations. On the
domestic point, Professor Spiro comes to a different conclusion. See Spiro, supra note
17, at 576-77 (arguing that "federalism understandings constitute a formal institutional
statement of law"). Professor Spiro notes:
Indeed, the pattern of a defeated amendment followed by a practice consis-
tent with the amendment's substance bears some resemblance to Bruce Ack-
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man rights would clear the way for compliance at the federal level, as
state and local noncompliance would no longer justify federal non-
compliance based on federalism concerns.
Facilitating state and local involvement in implementing human
rights standards may also address democratic deficits inherent in the
making and implementation of international law at the national level.
Because the international system is a system of states, national gov-
ernments-not individuals-participate in the development and
adoption of international norms. While NGOs are increasingly gain-
ing a voice in treaty-making arenas and other fora where important
international law decisions are made, access to these decision-making
processes is often mediated by elaborate credential requirements that
92limit participation.
Additionally, as discussed above, the general public is disengaged
from the primary processes through which human rights law is incor-
porated at. the national level. As the work of democratic experimen-
talists and other scholars suggests, similar democratic deficits are re-
flected in the formation of domestic legislation in the United States, 3
as well as in other contexts including the European Union. The
omission of the House from the treaty-ratification process is a factor
that may undermine further the democratic legitimacy of interna-
tional human rights treaty law. Subnational participation in incorpo-
rating human rights laws strengthens democratic deliberation of these
laws.
Participation by subnational governments and NGOs in incorpo-
rating human rights law can usefully be considered in the context of
92 Cf Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age of Globalization, 98 MICH. L. REv. 167,
170, 202-11 (1999) (proposing a theory of transnational institutions that could offer
"more effective opportunities for democratic participation in national and transna-
tional decision making").
93 See, e.g., MASHAW, supra note 28, at 100-01 (highlighting an interpretation of
public choice analysis of legislative organization in which committee members who are
unrepresentative of the Congress as a whole, and thus likely unrepresentative of the
people as a whole, dominate the legislative process); Doff & Sabel, suoa note 29, at
270-92 (proposing as a solution "democratic experimentalism" which combines federal
learning with the protection of the federated jurisdictions and the fights of individu-
als); Tushnet, supra note 38, at 1069-71 (discussing the democratic deficit inherent in
national politics in the U.S. and suggesting that general cultural transformation, rather
than the revival of constitutional federalism, may be the way to eliminate such a defi-
cit).
c4 See Gerstenberg & Sabel, supra note 59, at 2-5 (noting that the complexity of
multilevel governance in the European Union "renders implausible even the most
modest assumption of effective political oversight by an informed citizenry").
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federalism jurisprudence,"7 Congress may be hesitant to regulate con-
duct deemed to be quintessentially local in nature (such as criminal
and family law)."' At the very least, at the domestic level, a federalism
understanding represents a political gesture to reassure state and local
governments that the federal government will not use the treaty in
question to disturb existing divisions of power between national and
subnational units. 9 At the international level, the United States often
points to deference to states' rights as the reason why it cannot meet
international human rights requirements: In fact, it is not clear
whether the federal government can impose these requirements on
state and local governments through federal directives without violat-
ing the anti-commandeering doctrine, which prohibits the federal
government from issuing such directives." Thus, supporting state and
local governments to participate in domestic implementation of hu-
erman's and David Golove's description of how the congressional-executive
agreement came to win constitutional legitimacy outside of the Article II
treaty process. .. . In both episodes, proposed amendments were defeated in
part because of informal institutional agreement to respect their substance.
Id. at 576 n.32 (citing Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is Nafta Constitutional?, 108
HARv. L. REv. 799 (1995)). On the international point, Spiro agrees with Neuman
that federalism understandings lack international effect. Id. at 577; see also ICCPR, su-
pra note 5, at art. 50, S. EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2, at 38, 999 U.N.T.S. at 185, which applies to
"all parts of federal States without any limitations or exceptions."
See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that the fed-
eral government may not compel the states "to administer or enforce a federal regula-
tory program"); U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 549 (1995) (finding that a federal gun
control law banning firearm possession in local school zones exceeds Congress' Com-
merce Clause power); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992) (holding
that Congress may not commandeer the states' legislative processes by directly compel-
ling states to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program). But see Bush v. Gore,
531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (reversing the Florida Supreme Court on an issue of state law).
8 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 598-99 (2000) (striking down the
"civil rights remedy" provision in the Violence Against Women Act as unconstitutional,
holding that Congress lacked the authority to regulate the sphere reserved for the
states). For a critique of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Morrison, see
Resnik, supra note 17.
80 Neuman, supra note 84, at 52-53 ("The federalism understanding does, how-
ever, signal the political reality that some members of Congress are reluctant to exer-
cise existing federal power [to enforce treaties] in areas of traditional state regula-
tion.").90 See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 53rd Sess., 1405th mtg. 1 12-13, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/SR.]405 (1995) ("[T]he decision to retain [the death penalty] re-
flected a serious and considered democratic choice of the American public.... [The
juvenile death penalty was retained because a] large majority of states permitted juve-
niles to be tried as adults in grave cases involving capital offences at... 16 or 17.")See supra notes 82, 87 (explaining anticommandeering doctrine and cases, re-
spectively).
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the "disaggregation" of sovereignty, ' the permeability of national
borders, and the ascendancy of a transnational civil society.96 Interest-
ingly, the theory that the State is disaggregating concludes that the
formation of transnational networks between and among government
bureaucrats and judges within these States leads to greater convergence
and harmonization, not less. 7 Conceivably, intranational networks of
NGOs and/or state and local governments may lead to a similar con-
vergence of norms: At the same time, these local enactments might
be read as facilitating public policy experimentation. More diffuse
modes of implementing human rights law at various levels of govern-
ment are consistent with what other scholars have described as the
9 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 503, 505, 537 (1995) [hereinafter Slaughter, International Law] (envisioning "a
world of liberal States," in which the State and sovereignty are disaggregated into
"component political institutions"); see also SASKIA SASSEN, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS
DISCONTENTS 92 (1998) ("[T]here is an unbundling of sovereignty[:] ... the reloca-
tion of various components of sovereignty onto supranational, nongovernmental, or
private institutions."); Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, FOREIGN AFF.,
Sept./Oct. 1997, at 183, 184 ("The [S] tate is not disappearing, it is disaggregating into
its separate, functionally distinct parts. These parts... are networking with their coun-
terparts abroad, creating a dense web of relations that constitutes a new, transgovern-
mental order."); PeterJ. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1223
(1999) (extending Professor Slaughter's disaggregation thesis to include disaggrega-
tion of federal and subfederal actors).
ik See Tadashi Yamamoto & Jessica T. Mathews, Foreword to THE THIRD FORCE:
THE RISE OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY, at vi (Ann M. Florini ed., 2000) (arguing
that the "border-spanning networks" that comprise transnational civil society "are a
real and enduring force in the international relations of the twenty-first century"); see
also ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITi INTERNATIONAL REGULATORYAGREEMENTS 27 (1995) ("[E]ven [the
largest and most powerful States] cannot achieve their principal purposes... without
the help and cooperation of many other participants in the system, including entities
that are not [S]tates at all."); MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIvISTS
BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 3-5 (1998) (de-
scribing transnational advocacy networks as communication structures that use infor-
mation strategically "[t]o influence discourse, procedures, and policy" on an interna-
tional scale); Benvenisti, supra note 92, at 169 (advocating a "transnational conflict
paradigm" that "shows how domestic interest groups often cooperate with similarly
situated foreign interest groups in order to impose externalities on rival domestic
groups"); Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law
Home, 35 HOUS. L. REv. 623, 647-48 (1998) (describing the role of transnational norm
entrepreneurs, i.e., those who assist States to internalize norms in the transnational
legal process).
T7See Slaughter, International Law, supra note 95, at 512-13 (discussing the correla-
tion between a high level of transnational networks and a convergence in the reluc-
tance to use force among liberal democracies).
98 See Spiro, supra note 95, at 1267 ("Retaliation at the international level is in-
creasingly governed by norms rather than merely by interests, and indeed is now being
undertaken by a variety of actors beyond nation-states.").
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emergence and utilization of norm entrepreneurs, who develop
transnational networks as communication structures that use informa-
tion strategically.'
At the same time, drawing on the work of democratic experimen-
talists,'00 this Article argues that the federal government has an impor-
tant role to play in coordinating and extracting workable norms from
the various local initiatives. There is precedent for the federal gov-
ernment coordinating and encouraging participation of state and lo-
cal governments in international lawmaking in the trade area, which
could provide a possible model. 0 ' To avoid the problem of "divergent
and perhaps parochial state interpretations" °' of the same interna-
tional law rule, the federal government or other national entity must
99 See KECK& SIKKINK, supra note 96, at 16, 18-22 (highlighting the ability of trans-
national advocacy networks "to quickly and credibly generate politically usable infor-
mation and move it to where it will have the most impact"); see also Benvenisti, supra
note 92, at 202-03 (discussing the ability of transnational institutions to reduce infor-
mational asymmetries by, inter alia, "monitoring compliance of the various domestic
actors" with institutional policies and by "providing access and soliciting input from
NGOs representing a variety of interest groups").
100 See, e.g., Doff & Sabel, supra note 29, at 288 (calling "the overall system of pub-
lic problem solving that combines federal learning with the protection of the interests
of the federated jurisdictions and the rights of individuals democratic experimentalisn');
Archon Fung et al., Realizing Labor Standards: How Transparency, Competition, and Sanc-
tions Could Improve Working Conditions Worldwide, BOSTON REV., Feb./Mar. 2001, at
http://bostonreview.mit.edu/BR26.1/fung.html (proposing a strategy for strengthen-
ing labor standards that would use monitoring and public disclosure of working condi-
tions to create firm-level incentives for improvement); Brad Karkkainen et al., After
Backyard Environmentalism: Toward a Performance Based Regime of Environmental Regula-
tion, 44 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 690, 690 ("D] emocratic experimentalism combines the vir-
tues of localism, decentralization, and direct citizen participation with the discipline of
national coordination, transparency, and public accountability." (citation omitted));
Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 458, 462-63 (2001) (exploring the potential for a regulatory approach
in which "normative elaboration occurs through a fluid, interactive relationship be-
tween problem solving and problem definition within specific workplaces and in mul-
tiple other arenas, including but not limited to the judiciary").
10 See George Bermann, Federalism and the Enforceability of United States Treaty
Obligations 59 (Jan. 21, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). For ex-
ample, the federal government created an Intergovernmental Policy Advisory Commit-
tee (IGPAC) to provide subnational governmental input into international trade nego-
tiations in response to the requirement under the 1974 Trade Act that the President
seek advice from the "non-federal" government sector. Id. Approximately thirty to
forty state and local government officials, including governors, participate in the
IGPAC. Id. at 59 n.172. Additionally, because state and local governments demanded
similar assurances in the statutes implementing NAFTA and the Uruguay Round
Agreements, in both instances the legislation creates a process of consultation for sub-
national governments. Id. at 59.
102 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,425 (1964).
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serve the important role of coordinating information regarding local
initiatives. In exchange for permitting state and local governments
the flexibility to experiment, national coordinating agencies (de-
scribed below) should require state and local actors to share their
knowledge regarding implementation and compliance, 10 in order to
encourage exchange of information, mutual learning, and coordina-
tion. In working with these state and local actors as true partners in
devising broad national objectives (e.g., securing women's human
rights), national coordinating agencies could then monitor compli-
ance with these objectives through best practice performance stan-
dards developed at the local level and shared with other communities
while, at the same time, strengthening democratic accountability
through participation of people in decision making that affects
them. 
1 4
While dialogic federalism anticipates that the federal government
will play the role of coordination, where the government is unwilling
or unable, other national entities could fill this gap. These entities
might include national networks of state and local governments1°5 or
103 One model for assessing compliance with a treaty from which other states and
localities could learn is San Francisco's CEDAW gender analysis guidelines, which assist
in monitoring the implementation of CEDAW, the main treaty guaranteeing women's
rights, at the local level. See S.F. COMM'N ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN & CEDAW TASK
FORCE, A GENDER ANALYSIS: IMPLEMENTING THE CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION
OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN (1999) [hereinafter CEDAW TASK
FORCE, A GENDER ANALYSIS], available at http://www.ci.sf.ca.us/cosw/cedaw/pdf/
cedaw.pdf. For further discussion see infra note 130, describing San Francisco's
CEDAW gender analysis guidelines, and note 143, explaining that San Francisco's
CEDAW ordinance has been identified by the United Nations Development Funds for
Women in its collection of best practices worldwide for implementing CEDAW.
104 Dorf& Sabel, supra note 29, at 267. Dorf and Sabel are quick to distinguish the
broad freedom they seek for subnational government actors from the abdication of
federal responsibility thinly disguised as experimentalism in the context of welfare re-
form achieved through devolution. Id. at 434-38. Far from offering states increased
freedom to experiment, the 1996 Welfare Reform Act imposed a number of federal
goals concerning work requirements, as well as federal restrictions on eligibility (for
example, by declaring legally resident aliens ineligible for Supplemental Security In-
come or food stamps). Id. at 435 & n.541, 436. Clearly, this "new legislation flies in
the face of the localism that ostensibly animates it." Id. at 437.
105 Cf Resnik, supra note 17 (manuscript at 57 n.263) (noting that the Supreme
Court missed an opportunity to develop a more complex understanding of federalism
when it failed to consider the role of national organizations of state elected officials in
developing a nuclear waste disposal proposal that was adopted by Congress). In New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), the Court struck down the Congressional ini-
tiative adopting the proposal on the grounds that the requirements it placed on states
violated anticommandeering principles.
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NGOs. '°6 Thus, a dialogic federalism account of constitutionalism dif-
fers from democratic experimentalism in at least one critical respect:
it envisions a role for state and local participation even before there is
a federal commitment to coordinate this participation.
When it plays the coordinating role, the federal government may
be able to sidestep a central dilemma that has arisen in the context of
enforcing international norms in a federalist system: while Congress
cannot commandeer states under U.S. domestic law, international law
essentially depends on a form of commandeering."7 On my reading,
this dilemma results in part because the U.S. federal government is
caught between a negative rights paradigm that stems from its domes-
tic legal traditions and a mixed-rights approach that captures both
negative and positive obligations, which spring from the fuller con-
ception of rights found in international human rights law. Indeed,
international law requires national governments to implement legisla-
tion and makes national governments liable for failure to bring con-
stituent actors into compliance.1l ' By working cooperatively with state
and local governments to achieve domestic implementation of human
rights, the federal government need not commandeer the states. '"
106 See Benvenisti, supra note 92, at 206 (proposing a theory of transnational insti-
tutions in which well-informed NGOs could step in to play coordinating roles where
government does not).
107 See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 29, at 427 n.515 ("[l]nternational law.., depends
for its enforcement largely on national implementing legislation-what the Court
would call commandeering.").
,08 See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 5, at art. 2, para. 2, S. EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2, at 24, 999
U.N.T.S. at 173-74 ("[E]ach State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take
necessary steps .. . to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to
give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant."). Note that the federal
government can also be held accountable for violations of both subnational govern-
ments, see, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 5, at art. 50, S. EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2, at 38, 999
U.N.T.S. at 185 ("The provisions of the present Covenant shall extend to all parts of
federal States without any limitations or exceptions."), and private actors, when the
federal government is on notice and has the capacity to take corrective action, but fails
to act. See Velasquez Rodriquez Case (Hond.), 4 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C.) No. 4, at
para. 172 (1988) (explaining that a State may be internationally responsible for human
rights violations that are not directly imputable to it because of a "lack of due diligence
to prevent the violation or respond to it"), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/
humanrts/iachr/bl 1_12d.htm.
10 For a classic statement on the inefficiencies involved in commandeering states,
see Roderick M. Hills,Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Auton-
omy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REv. 813, 893-900 (1998).
See also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 145-57 (1993) (examining
the problems that arise when the federal government imposes limits on the powers of
the states to bargain with their citizens within the context of various government pro-
grams).
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Curiously, this cooperative federalism is reinforced by a sense of
competition as well. As NGOs increasingly attempt to use the global
marketplace as a means through which to exact economic retribution
on governments (at whatever level) that fail to observe human rights,
this economic discipline facilitates competition that stimulates "races
to the top" toward improved compliance." This "co-opetition""' ap-
proach to federalism maintains the national government as a primary
site for international lawmaking and accountability, while encourag-
ing cooperation with subnational authorities, who in turn may be in-
centivized to adopt human rights standards through competitive pres-
sures that "ratchet" standards upward."
2
111. A DIALOGIC FEDERALIST TYPOLOGY
From a dialogic federalist perspective, intergovernmental dialogue
proceeds along at least three different tracks, depending on the link-
age between national and subnational governments. The first track
involves state and local adoption of international human rights stan-
dards where the federal government has failed to ratify a treaty. As
has been the case with CEDAW, state and local enactments adopting
treaty standards call for federal ratification, and in this sense invite
dialogue with the federal government.' 3 A second track involves state
110 Cf Spiro, supra note 17, at 568-69, 588-89. Note that Professor Spiro goes a step
further than I am prepared to go in this Article in that he suggests that it would be
"more efficient" to hold state and local governments liable for violations along with the
federal government under a "condominium responsibility" concept-an approach that
would operate along the lines ofjoint and several liability under tort law. Id. In addi-
tion to suggesting applying the stick, Professor Spiro also suggests using the carrot ap-
proach by enabling state governments to be treaty partners. Id. at 590-95. As a possi-
ble precedent, he explores the opt-in model of treaty accession used in the trade
context. Id. at 592-93. Specifically, Spiro discusses the Agreement on Government
Procurement, which applies to "sub-central" governments only to the extent that such
entities agree to coverage, as is indicated by notification to the World Trade Organiza-
tion by the relevant central government (with the latter, remaining the only formal
parties to the agreement). Id. "The regime gives sub-national authorities, in effect, an
option to accept the treaty regime." Id. at 592; see also Paul Blustein, Thinking Globally,
Punishing Locally, WASH. POST, May 16, 1997, at GI (explaining that economic sanc-
tions imposed by state and local governments against objectionable foreign regimes
"raise the specter of multi-national companies being forced to make costly choices be-
tween giving up lucrative contracts with government agencies or foregoing business in
some of the world's most promising markets").
III Cf ADAM M. BRANDENBURGER & BARRYJ. NALEBUFF, CO-OPETITION 11-39 (de-
scribing ways in which cooperation and competition can be mutually reinforcing in the
business context).
112 Fung et al., supra note 100, at 2.
1 3 Similarly, cities that have urged their states and the federal government to sup-
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and local efforts to implement international obligations that the fed-
eral government has adopted through ratification or other acknow-
ledgement that it is bound (for example, through the application of
customary international law) but not fully implemented. As has been
the case with the consular notification requirement for foreign na-
tionals arrested and detained-an obligation under the Vienna Con-
vention on Consular Relations-state and local legislative adoption of
such requirements invites dialogue with federal efforts to implement
the requirement more fully, and in so doing may allay federalism con-
cerns the United States has expressed in the context of international
criticism where the obligation has not been observed." 4  A third
track-involving state and local efforts to apply human rights princi-
ples contained in treaty provisions for which the United States has en-
tered a reservation-is possible, but to my knowledge is still hypotheti-
cal. In the context of juvenile death penalty litigation, for example,
defense lawyers have argued that the U.S. treaty reservation concern-
ing the prohibition on the juvenile death penalty in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights"5 is invalid; however, state and
port the U.N. Commission on Human Rights' call for a death penalty moratorium may
be read as initiating dialogue with these states and the federal government.
14 For an expression of the U.S. federalism concerns in this context, see LaGrand
Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.CJ. No. 104 (June 27), available at http://www.icj-cji.org, a
case challenging the death sentences imposed on two German nationals by the state of
Arizona. In that case, the United States contended that one "constraining factor" on
its ability to satisfy the international obligation regarding consular notification was "the
character of the United States of America as a federal Republic of divided powers." Id.
at para. 95. While the United States has adopted the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, it has frequently failed to ensure the enforcement of the rights of foreign
nationals under the treaty. See Rebecca E. Woodman, International Miranda? Article 36
of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, J. KAN. B. ASS'N, June/July 2001, at 41-42
(suggesting that failure to enforce the rights of foreign nationals under the Conven-
tion "not only violates international law, it weakens the status and authority of the
United States in the international community"). Some states and local governments
such as Florida have incorporated the consular notification obligation directly into
state law. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 901.26(3), 288.816(2)(f) (West 2001). These subna-
tional efforts invite dialogue with federal efforts to provide for more effective imple-
mentation of the treaty. See, e.g., Catherine Brown, Consular Notification Liaison and
Legal Advisor, State Department, International Law & the Work of Federal & State
Governments, Remarks at the American Society of International Law 2001 Annual
Meeting (Apr. 4-6, 2001) ("[W]hat I have been trying to do is get federal, state and lo-
cal law enforcement judicial and other officials to comply with these notification re-
quirements.").
115 See U.S. RUDs to the ICCPR, supra note 5, at 8070 ("[T]he United States re-
serves the right.., to impose capital punishment on any person ... duly convicted
under existing or future laws permitting the imposition of capital punishment, includ-
ing such punishment for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age.").
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local governments have not yet undertaken legislative initiatives to ad-
vance this prohibition or to repeal laws that are inconsistent with it.
Only the first track along which dialogic federalism operates is
explored in further detail here. It is currently the most active ap-
proach and, therefore, provides the richest source for examination.
State and local adoption of international human rights standards,
where the federal government has failed to ratify a treaty, represents a
response to the federal government's failure to incorporate the stan-
dards. One could view with despair the federal government's failure
to ratify several human rights treaties," seeing this as an indication
that the national government is unwilling or unable to implement
these norms through the normal channels provided under the U.S.
Constitution and anticipated by international law."' This failure is
rooted in the structure of international law, which derives primarily
from the will and consent of national governments. 8 However,
rather than view these conditions with despair, one could also see this
failure as the result of decisions made by federal officials who were
democratically elected and who, in this sense, represent our democ-
racy at work. A dialogic approach views these institutional realities "as
creating the occasion for, indeed in part anticipating, a radical re-
definition of our democratic and constitutional ideals."" Therefore,
116 See supra note 55 for examples of treaties the United States has signed but not
ratified.
17 Paradoxically, the initiative taken by state and local governments in supporting
human rights where the federal government is unwilling or unable to do so mirrors
developments in the international criminal justice area where, under the notion of
complementarity, international institutions step in to enforce human rights norms
where national governments are unwilling or unable. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the In-
ternational Criminal Court, June 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 999, 1003 (establishing an inter-
national court that is complementary to national criminal jurisdictions). Of course, in
the United States, the federal government historically also has played this back-
stopping role, particularly with respect to civil fights, where, until quite recently (and
to some extent today), the assertion of "states' rights" and "local control" indicated a
lack of willingness or ability by state and local governments to enforce civil rights. See,
e.g., RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLEJUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD (EDI)uGA T0N
AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 748-78 (1976) (framing Brown v. Board
of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and civil rights legislation in general, as efforts by the
federal government to control local enforcement of civil rights).
118 See Christine Chinkin, Normative Development in the International Legal System, in
COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 21, 41 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000) ("[T]he reality is that
[S]tates and other international actors have recourse to diverse methods of setting
agendas, influencing behavior, and supplementing and shading international obliga-
tions.").
119 Gerstenberg & Sabel, supra note 59, at 5.
2001]
276 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
this Article takes an optimistic view of these conditions, seeing in them
an opportunity to reconceptualize available avenues for deliberation
and develop new methods that broaden and deepen consensus over
human rights law.
The "adoption" of human rights treaties and standards at the state
and local levels largely represents a form of communication through
which people and communities, who are more effectively able to mo-
bilize at the local level, signify the need for the federal government to
play a more active role in human rights lawmaking.2 0 In fact, many of
the ordinances and resolutions adopted by state and local govern-
ments explicitly call for the federal government to adopt particular
human rights treaties and standards. 2 ' In this sense, the direct incor-
poration of human rights norms by state and local governments
should be seen as providing a method for creating momentum and
building pressure for change at the federal level.
Following the approach taken in scholarship on democratic ex-
perimentalism, I am going to theorize by looking at the facts, that is,
by looking at what is actually happening on the ground in two areas of
state and local activity where a federal role is absent: women's human
rights and capital punishment.
1. State and Local CEDAW Activity: Despite the representations
made by the Clinton administration to "bring Beijing home," the U.S.
government has done very little at the federal level to incorporate the
commitments undertaken by governments at the United Nations
Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing, China, in
1995."' An Inter-Agency Council on Women was established to coor-
dinate the incorporation of aspects of the Beijing Platform for Ac-
tion. 1 2" However, the work of the Inter-Agency Council has been
largely symbolic. 24 Additionally, the United States has yet to ratify
120 Cf Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A Gen-
eral Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1503, 1520-27 (2000) (viewing the democratic state
as a collective agent and analyzing the expressive dimensions of state action).
See infra notes 131-133, 138-141, 159 and accompanying text.
122 See Benjamin D. Knaupp, Comment, Classifying International Agreements Under
U.S. Law: The Beijing Platform as a Case Study, 1998 BYU L. REV. 239, 262 ("The United
States has signed the [Beijing] Platform, but has proclaimed that it is not binding ....
Without a clear understanding of the legal status of the Beijing Platform and other
U.N. declarations, confusion and tension between Congress and the President in the
sphere of foreign affairs powers will worsen.").
123 Rhonda Copelon, The Indivisible Framework of International Human Rights: A
Source of SocialJustice in the U.S., 3 N.Y. CrY L. REV. 59, 77 (1998).
124 Id. at 77 ("While [the Inter-Agency Council] gives women a limited route to
influence government policy.., the potential of the Beijing Platform is not felt be-
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CEDAW, the main treaty guaranteeing women's rights. Furthermore,
while the executive branch pointed to the Violence Against Women
Act (VAWA) as evidence of its compliance with the ICCPR in its re-
port to the U.N. Human Rights Committee,125 part of VAWA was re-
cently struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court. '12 In United States v.
Morrison, the Supreme Court held that Congress lacked authority to
enact the civil remedy that provides a cause of action for VAWA.121 In
so doing, the Court completely ignored the fact that international
human rights law (as incorporated into U.S. law) not only authorizes
Congress to enact effective remedies to challenge gender-based vio-
lence, but in fact compels the U.S. government to provide such reme-
dies to meet current obligations under the treaty.
2
While federal implementation of international standards concern-
ing women's rights has lagged, some local governments have incorpo-
rated CEDAW directly into local law. The City of San Francisco pio-
neered this approach by making CEDAW part of its local law in 1998,
three years after the Beijing Conference. With respect to the re-
quirements imposed by CEDAW at the international level, the city's
Juvenile Probation Department and its Department of Public Works
have filed reports containing gender analyses of their delivery of serv-
cause many U.S. women are unaware of its provisions... [or] do not use it as a plat-
form for action or an instrument of accountability.").
125 See Press Release, United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Committee
Begins Considering Initial Report of United States 8, U.N. Doc. HR/CT/400 (Mar. 29,
1995) (reporting statement of Jo Ann Harris, assistant attorney general in the United
States Department ofJustice Criminal Division, that VAWA "was the most comprehen-
sive federal effort to date to address violence against women").
126 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (concluding that Con-
gress lacked the constitutional authority to enact VAWA's civil remedy for victims of
gender-motivated violence under both the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses).
I27 ld.
128 See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 5, at art. 2, para. 3, S. EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2, at 24, 999
U.N.T.S. at 174 (requiring that each State party to the Covenant take necessary steps to
give effect to the rights recognized in the Covenant and to ensure effective remedies
should such rights be violated); Brief of Amici Curiae on Behalf of International Law
Scholars and Human Rights Experts in Support of Petitioners at 2, United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (No. 99-0029) ("The text of the treaty, in conjunction
with subsequent unanimous and binding interpretations by the international commu-
nity, make clear that the ICCPR requires the U.S. to provide protection from gender-
based violence from both private persons and public officials."); see also supra notes 56-
57 and accompanying text (discussing the United States' failure to enact the legislation
required to fulfill its international treaty obligations).
129 SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, ch. 12K (2001), available at
http://www.amlegal.com/sanfranadmin/lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=main-j.htm&2.0.
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ices, employment practices, and budget allocation.'" In signing the
city ordinance, Mayor Willie Brown, Jr., pointed out: "[t]he United
States is the only industrialized country in the world that has yet to rat-
ify CEDAW." 3' Sending a signal to Washington, Mayor Brown stated:
"We want to set an example for the rest of the nation because it is long
overdue."132 Similarly, explaining why her organization and other ad-
vocacy groups mobilized in support of the city ordinance, Krishanti
Dharmaraj, the Executive Director of the Women's Institute for Lead-
ership Development (WILD) for Human Rights said: "We couldn't
just keep waiting for the federal government.' 3 1 While it may be too
soon to evaluate the impact of the ordinance, its value may be more
than symbolic. The city ordinance may have a concrete impact on the
allocation of services (such as extra street lighting in high crime areas
114
to assist in preventing violence against women, and summer sports
programs for girls), employment (in city agencies15 and in the private
sector ), and differential arrest patterns. 137
130 See CEDAW TASK FORCE, A GENDER ANALYSIS, supra note 103, at 14-64 (docu-
menting the efforts made by these city departments to conform with CEDAW require-
ments).
Gretchen Sidhu, San Francisco Plunges Ahead in Adopting a CEDAW Treaty of Its
Own, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 2,1998, § 13, at 8.
Id. San Francisco has long been a leader in human rights, having hosted, for
example, the U.N. Conference on International Organizations, during which the U.N.
Charter was adopted. See The UN Charter as History (Jane D. Weaver rep.), 89 AM. SOC'Y
INT'L L. PROC. 45, 59 (1995) ("[T]he status of the individual in human rights first re-
ceived recognition in the San Francisco UN Conference.").
133 Sidhu, supra note 131.
1,4 See id. ("[E]xtra street lights [are] something women have demanded for years
and male city planners have routinely ignored.").
135 SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, ch. 12K.3(a)(1) (2001) ("The
City shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women and
girls in the City of San Francisco in employment and other economic
opportunities... ."), available at http://www.amlegal.com/sanfranadmin/
lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=main-j.htm&2.0. The City of San Francisco is the largest em-
ployer in the Bay Area. Sidhu, supra note 131.
[.6 SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, ch. 12K.3 (2001) ("The City shall
ensure that the City does not discriminate against women in areas including employ-
ment practices, allocation of funding and delivery of direct and indirect services."),
available at http://www.amlegal.com/sanfranadmin/lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=main-
j.htm&2.0; see also Sidhu, supra note 131 (suggesting that the City may be able to re-
quire that women be appropriately represented in management of private firms bid-
ding for city contracts and licenses).
37 Women arrested in San Francisco say they are treated differently from men.
For example, Sonia Melara, executive director of San Francisco's Commission on the
Status of Women, explains that women dancers in legal exotic clubs have been ar-
rested as prostitutes, while the male club owners go free. Sidhu, supra note 131.
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The symbolic value of the San Francisco ordinance, however, can-
not be underestimated. Following San Francisco's lead, the Los Ange-
les City Council has adopted a Resolution in Support of CEDAW. 
3
1
Moreover, as of August, 2000, 39 cities, 17 counties, 16 states, and the
Territory of Guam had adopted resolutions calling for the United
States to ratify CEDAW. 139 Unlike San Francisco's CEDAW law, the
resolutions of the other cities and states are nonbinding. In most
cases, the resolutions can be read as seeking local implementation as
well as national ratification. 140  In this sense, much of the local
CEDAW work is directed toward the goal of building momentum to
pressure the U.S. government to ratify CEDAW, rather than. enlisting
cities and states to function as laboratories for a range of experimen-
tation. 41 Nonetheless, the coordination of these local efforts to affect
national norms operates along democratic experimentalist lines in
that local governments are learning from each other through national
organizations of state and local elected officials, as well as through
networks of scholars and activists.
Besides the value of building political momentum, this local treaty
work also helps to translate broad abstract principles contained in
human rights treaties into concrete, definable standards on the
ground. Assuming the federal government eventually adopts
CEDAW, the precedent developed at the local level will help inform
implementation at the national and even international level. This lo-
cal work on the periphery, then, may help redefine core activities, and
in so doing may ultimately help undermine the dichotomy between
core and periphery.
42
138 Los Angeles City Resolution in Support of CEDAW, L.A. City Council (L.A.,
Cal., 2000), http://www.ci.la.ca.us/csw/html/cswpge3d.htm.
139 WILD for Human Rights: CEDAW Around the U.S., at
http://www.wildforhumanrights.org/cedaw-aroundus.html (last visited Nov. 26,
2001). Other cities, such as Seattle, are considering adopting similar resolutions. See
Seattle Women's Commission: Legislative Action, at http://www.cityofseattle.net/
civilrights/swc/legislat.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2001) (listing "Support any CEDAW
legislation" as one of six legislative priorities for the 2001 state legislative session).
140 Cf Resnik, supra note 17 (manuscript at 52) ("[CEDAW p]roponent's goals are
to change both local and national laws; their means deploy local actors working in
concert with outsiders.").
141 Id. (manuscript at 52-53) ("To conceive of local action as... indigenous to a
particular place is to miss how much of that work is a product of broad efforts to shift
socialpolicy.").
14, Cf Doff & Sabel, supra note 29, at 445 ("[A]s democracy increasingly comes to
mean decentralized, direct deliberation, it will be increasingly difficult to distinguish
the citizen's participatory rights in these particular settings from those more general
'process-perfecting' rights to democratic participation that are frequently taken as the
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But, rather than take a passive role, the federal government
should play a more active role in these local efforts. For example, the
federal government could use the Inter-Agency Council on Women as
a national coordinating agency, pooling information, monitoring best
practices, 4 3 and feeding these participatory experiences from local
communities into the effort to build national support for federal
treaty action.
2. State and Local Calls for a Death Penalty Moratorium: State and lo-
cal calls for a death penalty moratorium often rely on international
standards. In recent years, the United States has come under intense
international criticism for its death penalty practices.1 44  However,
many states continue to execute minors and allow tremendous race
disparities in the application of the death penalty, 145 in violation of in-
ternational law.' While the death penalty itself is permitted under
most fundamental of all political liberties.").
143 The San Francisco ordinance has already been identified by the United Na-
tions Development Fund for Women in its collection of best practices worldwide for
implementing CEDAW. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT FUND FOR WOMEN, BRINGING
EQUALITY HOME: IMPLEMENTING THE CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL
FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN, available at
http://www.unifem.undp.org/cedaw/cedawen7.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2001).
144 See, e.g., Roger Cohen, America the Roughneck (Through Europe's Eyes), N.Y. TIMES,
May 7, 2001, at A] 0 (quoting the British paper, The Guardian, which called American's
position on the death penalty "morally untenable," and explaining that America's
"ease" with the death penalty is contributing to "the growing hostility to the United
States"); Editorial, Europe's View of the Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2001, § 4
(Week in Review), at 12 ("European politicians and intellectuals, who view the death
penalty as a human rights issue, are incredulous that Americans support a punishment
that fails to deter crime, targets mainly those who cannot afford a decent lawyer, is
used on the mentally retarded and has often gotten the wrong man.").
145 See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, KILLING WITH PREJUDICE: RACE AND THE
DEATH PENALTY IN THE USA, at http://www.amnestyusa.org/rightsforall/dp/race/
index.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2001) [hereinafter KILLING WITH PREJUDICE] (showing
"how the death penalty in the U.S. is applied disproportionately on the basis of race,
ethnicity and social status").
146 For the prohibition on the juvenile death penalty adopted by the United Na-
tions see ICCPR, supra note 5, at art. 6, para. 5, S. EXEC. DOC. E, 95-2, at 25, 999
U.N.T.S. at 175; and Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 55, at 55, stat-
ing that "capital punishment... shall [not] be imposed for offenses committed by per-
sons below eighteen years of age," which is not ratified by the United States. For the
prohibition on race discrimination adopted by the United Nations, see ICCPR, supra
note 5, at arts. 2, 26, S. EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2, at 24, 31, 999 U.N.T.S. at 173, 179, codify-
ing member nations' obligation to protect the rights of all citizens equally. See generally
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, S.
EXEC. Doc. C, 95-2, at 1 (1965) (condemning racial discrimination and undertaking
"to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating racial
discrimination in all its forms and promoting understanding among all races").
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international law as an exception to the right to life, 147 the Second Op-
148
tional Protocol to the ICCPR calls for its abolition, and the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights has called for a moratorium
on executions.
14
9
In justifying U.S. death penalty practices to the Human Rights
Committee-the treaty body that oversees the ICCPR-during the
United States' first compliance hearing, State Department Legal Advi-
sor Conrad Harper testified that the decision to retain the death pen-
alty represented a democratic choice.' 0 Having entered a reservation
to the ICCPR provision barring juvenile executions, the United States
is one of only six nations that continues to execute minors. The
United States stands in the company of Iran, Nigeria, and Saudi Ara-
bia as the only countries that execute people for crimes they commit-
ted asjuveniles.'r'
On the domestic front, there is a growing sense that the error
rates 52 and race disparities1 53 in the application of the death penalty
require its reevaluation. However, from a domestic political perspec-
tive, federal attempts to restrict or regulate the states' use of the death
penalty would run afoul of federalism concerns-a point frequently
raised by U.S. representatives in international fora in which U.S. death
147 ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 6, para. 2, S. EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2, at 25, 999 U.N.T.S. at
174-75.
148 Second Optional Protocol, supra note 5.
149 Resolution Supporting Worldwide Moratorium on Executions, Hum. Rts. Comm.
(Apr. 1999), availalle at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/UN-
Statements.htinl#resolution (last visited Oct. 25, 2001).
150 U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 53rd Sess., 1405th mtg. 12, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/SR.1405 (1995) (summarizing testimony by American representatives that
"the decision to retain [the death penalty] reflected a serious and considered demo-
cratic choice of the American public" and that "it was not appropriate in that demo-
cratic system to dismiss considered public opinion and impose by fiat a different
view").
America's Shame-Killing Kids, National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty,
at http://www.ncadp.org/html/factl.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2001). By comparison,
Pakistan and Yemen have just recently changed their laws to exclude the execution of
offenders under the age of eighteen. People's Union for Civil Liberties, Amnesty Inter-
national: Children and the Death Penalty; Executions Worldwide Since 1990, Apr. 2001, at
http://www.pucl.org/reports/International/2001/executions.htm.
152 See, e.g., James S. Liebman et al., A Broken System: Error Rates in Capital Cases,
1973-1995, at http://www.law.columbia.edu/instructionalservices/liebman (last vis-
ited Oct. 25, 2001) (presenting statistical evidence to show that America's death pen-
alty sgstem is persistently and systematically fraught with error).
'I See, e.g., KILLING WITH PREJUDICE, supra note 145 ("[R]acial discrimination per-
vades the U.S. death penalty at every stage of the process .... ).
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penalty practices are criticized.15 4 Under international law, however,
national governments can be held accountable for treaty violations of
subnational governments and their officials. As described above, a
way to sidestep this paradox of federalism is to incentivize state and
local governments themselves to adopt human rights standards.
State and local initiatives calling for a moratorium cite interna-
tional standards as authority, in the sense that international norms
provide an interpretative device, not binding legal standards. For ex-
ample, in a resolution calling on state officials in Maryland as well as
federal officials to place a moratorium on executions, the Baltimore
City Council cites an Amnesty International source that indicates that
80% of all executions in 1999 occurred in 4 countries-the United
States, China, Iran, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
15 6
Philadelphia has also passed a resolution calling for the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania to impose a moratorium on executions.
57
Pointing out that "every nation in Europe and the vast majority of the
democratic nations of the world have abolished the death penalty,"
the Philadelphia resolution also relies on the U.N. Human Rights
Commission's call for an international moratorium on the death pen-
alty. The Village of Yellow Springs, Ohio and the City Council of
154 See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 53d Sess., 1405th mtg. 13, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/SR.1405 (1995) (reporting that a large majority of American states permitted
juveniles to be tried as adults in grave cases involving capital offenses at the age of ei-
ther sixteen or seventeen).
15 See, e.g., Bermann, supra note 101, at 60 ("[T]he treaty violations for which a
nation is responsible include those committed not only by their own officials but also
by sub-national governments and their officials."); see also IVAN BERNIER,
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ASPECTS OF FEDERALISM 83 (1973) ("On the authority of cer-
tain decisions, federal states are considered by most international law writers as re-
sponsible for the acts or omissions of their component units."); IAN BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 449 (4th ed. 1990) ("A state cannot plead
the principles of municipal law, including its constitution, in answer to an interna-
tional claim."); Spiro, supra note 17, at 580 n.47 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 207(b) & reporter's note 3
(1987)); Report of the International Law Commission on State Responsibility, [1971] 2 Y.B.
Int'l L. Comm'n 193, 257, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/217/ADD2). But see John Norton
Moore, Federalism and Foreign Relations, 1965 DUKE L.J. 248, 249 (1965) (discussing the
area of "uncertainty regarding the relationship between state policies and the national
foreign relations power").
A Council Resolution Concerning: In support of a Moratorium on the Death
Penalty (House Bill 388), Balt. City Council, Council Bill 00-0032 (Balt., Md. 2000).
Resolution: Calling for a Moratorium on the Imposition of Any Death Penalty
in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Until a Fair and Impartial Study of the Applica-
tion of the Death Penalty Is Conducted, Phila. City Council (Phila., Pa., 2000).
158 Id.
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Santa Cruz, California, have also relied on the U.N. Human Rights
Commission's call for a death penalty moratorium in passing resolu-
tions requesting that their respective states and the federal govern-
ment impose a moratorium on the death penalty.1
5
9
The federal government has a role to play in coordinating state
and local initiatives that call for the observance of human rights stan-
dards in the death penalty context. One possibility is for the federal
government to play a coordinating role through the Inter-Agency
Working Group on Implementation of Human Rights Treaties estab-
lished under Executive Order 13,107 to oversee implementation of
the Race and Torture Conventions. I"3 In particular, the Inter-Agency
Working Group could review best practices and pool information so
that these participatory experiences could filter up from local com-
munities to build support for national standards. Such support is
necessary, for example, to create momentum for a review of the U.S.
reservation on the ICCPR provision barring juvenile executions. Ac-
cording to Executive Order 13,107, the executive branch is required
to review the appropriateness of all existing reservations to human
rights treaties. 16'
IV. THE ROLE OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL DIALOGUE IN SHAPING
NATIONAL LAW
The dialogic approach to incorporating human rights law ex-
plored here engages the debate over federalism and international
lawmaking by advancing a path between the two approaches on either
side of this debate. The traditional (and predominant) approach
held by international law scholars is that, as a constitutional and prac-
tical matter, the federal government is the primary site for implemen-
tation and enforcement of international law. This traditional view
takes many forms. In response to revisionist critics who claim federal
courts are restricted from interpreting customary international law on
federalism grounds,162 scholars who follow the traditional approach have
159 Call for a Moratorium of Executions, Council of the Vill. of Yellow Springs, Res.
99-39 (Vill. of Yellow Springs, Ohio 1999); A Resolution of the City Council of the City
of Santa Cruz Requesting That the State and Federal Governments Enact and Adopt
Legislation Imposing a Moratorium on Executions at Least Until Fair and Equitable
Policies and Practices Are Implemented, City Council of the City of Santa Cruz, Res.
NS-23, 806 (Santa Cruz, Cal., 1998).
160 Exec. Order No. 13,107, 63 Fed. Reg. 68,991-68,992 (Dec. 15, 1998).
161 Id. at 68,991.
162 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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defended the authority of federal courts in interpreting customary in-
ternational law. '("" These scholars draw support from the vision of the
nation's Founders, who, due to the failure of the Articles of Confed-
eration, framed a Constitution establishing a national government "to
articulate uniform positions on such uniquely federal matters as for-
eign affairs and international law."'" 4  Additionally, these scholars
point to the Constitution's assignment of international lawmaking
powers to the federal government and divestment of such powers
from state and local governments. 63 Moreover, these scholars note
that state and local governments are unrecognized as actors within the
structure of international law.'.. Finally, these scholars argue that Su-
preme Court precedent acknowledges constitutional and policy con-
siderations underlying the need for the nation to speak with "oneS 167
voice" in foreign affairs through the president. In response to revi-
sionist critics who claim federal courts are restricted from interpreting
customary international law on separation of powers grounds, scholars
who subscribe to the traditional view defend the jurisdiction of federal
courts over international claims, even in the absence of action from
the political branches enacting customary international law. " ' To
some extent, traditionalists also support the self-executing nature of
international law in the absence of implementing legislation from
163 See, e.g., Koh, supra note 10, at 1827 (defending the traditional ability of federal
courts to incorporate norms of CIL into federal law as "a sensible, settled rule that all
three federal branches and the fifty states have consistently followed"); Neuman, supra
note 10, at 376 (arguing that federal courts should continue to "apply only those
norms [of CIL] that external evidence demonstrates embody genuine international
legal obligations binding on the United States"); Stephens, supra note 10, at 397
("[T]he determination of the content of customary international law and of whether
or not it applies in a given situation is a federal question, which triggers federal courtjurisdiction and on which federal courts decisions are binding on the states.").
164 Koh, supra note 10, at 1825; see also supra note 42 and accompanying text (pre-
senting historical arguments that the framers intended that the federal government
control U.S. foreign relations).
165 See supra note 43 and accompanying text (analyzing the text of the Constitution
to argue that the federal government retains a virtual monopoly over U.S. involvement
in foreign affairs).
166 See, e.g.,Jessup, supra note 15, at 743 ("The several states of the Union are enti-
ties unknown to international law.").
167 Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 381 (2000); see also cases
and sources cited supra notes 14-15, 45 (analyzing Supreme Court cases and other legal
scholarship indicating that uniform foreign policy requires federal courtjurisdiction).
168 See, e.g., Koh, supra note 10, at 1842 ("[W]hen customary international norms
are well-defined, the executive branch has regularly urged the federal courts to deter-
mine such rules as matters of federal law.").
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Congress,' 61' under the theory that political branches have already had
input in the making of customary international law (through state
practice) and of treaties (through the ratification process, in which
the President "makes" treaties with the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate). Furthermore, these scholars criticize the practice through which
political branches attempt to limit the role of the federal courts in
considering treaty matters by attaching non-self-executing declara-
tions to treaties. These scholars question whether such non-self-
executing declarations have either domestic or international effect, 17"
and criticize these declarations as violating the spirit of the Supremacy
Clause's declaration that treaties are the law of the land. 17 Relying on
Supreme Court precedent, these scholars also argue that the treaty
power authorizes Congress to legislate in areas beyond those specifi-
cally conferred on Congress and is not subject to Tenth Amendment
limitations (at least of the non-commandeering variety) .
Revisionist scholars challenge the traditional view by claiming that
the federal government's role in making international law is limited
by federalism and separation of powers principles. The revisionist
view finds different forms of expression that correspond to and chal-
lenge the various aspects of the traditional approach outlined above.
Perhaps the most prominent attack by revisionists has been on the
role of the federal courts in determining customary international
law. 7-3 On both federalism and separation of powers grounds, revi-
693 See, e.g., Flaherty, supra note 56, at 2151-52 (focusing on eighteenth-century
British and American history to argue that the traditional understanding of treaties as
self-executing is correct); Vazquez, supra note 56, at 718 (arguing that Congressional
action is needed only in situations where legislative authority is required to do "what
the treaty makers agreed to do but lack the [constitutional] power to accomplish").170 See, e.g., Damrosch, supra note 56, at 515 (observing a pattern in which the Sen-
ate tries to weaken the domestic legal effect of treaties by attaching non-self-executing
declarations and arguing for the limited use of these declarations); Henkin, supra note
64, at 346 ("The Framers intended that a treaty should become law ipsofacto, when the
treaty is made; it should not require legislative implementation to convert it into
United States law.").
171 See HENKIN, supra note 56, at 201-02 (calling the recent practice of declaring
some apparently self-executing treaties non-self-executing "anti-Constitutional").
172 See, e.g., Golove, supra note 8, at 1281-83 (defending the viability of Missouri v.
Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), and arguing that the Tenth Amendment does not act as
an affirmative restraint on Congress' delegated treaty power).
173 The two scholars most closely identified with this position are Curtis Bradley
and Jack Goldsmith. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique of the Modern Position, supra note
11, at 856 (rejecting the traditional inclusion of international law within federal
common law due to a lack of "domestic federal authorization for federal courts to
interpret and apply [CIL] as federal law"); Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy,
supra note 11, at 349 (defending their earlier position that "federal courts should not
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sionist scholars contend that federal courts lack jurisdiction over cus-
tomary international law in the aftermath of the Supreme Court's fa-
mous statement in Erie that "there is no federal general common
law."'174 Because customary international law is a form of common law,
revisionists claim that determinations of customary international law
are questions of state law that "federal courts should not apply... as
federal law without some authorization to do so by the federal politi-
cal branches."''7 5 The federalism critique also extends to the treaty
context in the sense that revisionists claim Congressional treaty power
is subject to the Tenth Amendment and cannot extend to areas be-
yond Congress' enumerated powers.76 Additionally, revisionists ques-
tion traditionalist concerns over the practice of declaring treaties non-
self-executing by insisting that this practice safeguards the separation
of powers."'
The main fault lines between the traditional and revisionist ap-
proaches-federalism and separation of powers-essentially center on
questions of authority. Consider how each dimension of the debate
frames a question reflecting anxiety over who has authority to bind
and what laws bind. Do federal courts have independent authority to
make determinations regarding customary international law (absent
action by the political branches), or does this authority reside solely in
state courts, as courts of general jurisdiction?" Does Congress have
apply [CIL] as federal law without some authorization to do so by the federal political
branches"). For earlier work on the same point, see Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist
View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665, 672, 707-16 (1986), in which
he states, "courts should never apply customary international law except pursuant to
political branch direction"; and A.M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and Interna-
tional Cases, 20 YALEJ. INT'L L. 1, 48 (1995), stating "[CIL] is not federal law and thus
provides no authority for imposing limits [on the federal government]."
174 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); see Bradley & Goldsmith,
Current Illegitimacy, supra note 11, at 324 (arguing that to be consistent with Erie, a "new
federal common law must be authorized in some fashion by the U.S. Constitution of a
federal statute").
175 Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy, supra note 11, at 349.
76 See Bradley, Treaty Power, supra note 11, at 435 (" [W] hatever limitations the
Tenth Amendment does impose, it is not evident... why these limitations should not
apply to the treaty power.").
Se.g., Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution, supra note 56, at 2074-80 (using his-
torical and comparative evidence to respond to traditionalist critiques of non-self-
execution as being at odds with the Supremacy Clause and inconsistent with the Fram-
ers' notions); Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 56, at 2220 ("Treaties can-
not receive judicial enforcement in areas that fall within Congress's Article 1, Section 8
powers, without statutory implementation by Congress.").
178 Compare Henkin, supra note 10, at 1559 ("[It makes no sense] that questions of
international law should be treated as questions of state rather than federal law .. "),
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authority to exercise its treaty power in areas beyond its enumerated
powers (as Missouri v. Holland held), or is the treaty power subject to
Tenth Amendment limitations reserving certain powers to the
states?' 9 Do federal courts have authority to consider claims brought
under a treaty where the political branches have failed to provide im-
plementing legislation executing the treaty?80 It is precisely on ques-
tions of authority-specifically, who has authority to implement, inter-
pret, and enforce international law in the U.S.-that the two
approaches both converge (in examining these questions) and di-
verge (in the answers they give to these questions). While diametri-
cally opposed on where they come out, as two sides framing a promi-
nent debate, traditionalists and revisionists essentially ask the same set
of questions regarding authority. For the purposes of this Article, I
Jessup, supra note 15, at 742 ("[Judicial precedent indicates] that international law
constitutes a 'federal general common law."'), Koh, supra note 10, at 1827 ("[U]nder
current practice, federal courts regularly incorporate norms of customary international
law into federal law."), Neuman, supra note 10, at 384 ("The [s]tates have no reserved
sovereignty to act on the international plane; the Constitution was designed to take
that away from them."), and Stephens, supra note 10, at 397 ("[T]he determination of
the content of customary international law and of whether or not it applies in a given
situation is a federal question, which triggers federal court jurisdiction and on which
federal court decisions are binding on the states."), with Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique
of the Modern Position, supra note 11, at 817 ("[Viewing CIL as part of a federal common
law] is founded on a variety of questionable assumptions and ... is in tension with
fundamental constitutional principles."), and Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy,
supra note 11, at 349 ("[I]f [CIL] is not federal law, federal courts are not to apply it
unless they determine that it is part of state law.").
17. Compare Golove, supra note 8, at 1081-82 (arguing that the Tenth Amendment
does not create subject matter limitations on the treaty power because the latter is a
power delegated to the federal government), with Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power
and American Federalism Part II, 99 MICH. L. REV. 98, 111-18 (2000) (replying to Profes-
sor Golove and arguing that federalism concerns limit the treaty power), and Bradley,
Treaty Power, supra note 11, at 434-36 (claiming congressional treaty power is subject to
Tenth Amendment limitations reserving certain powers to the states).
180 Compare Damrosch, supra note 56, at 527 (questioning whether non-self-
executing declarations have either domestic or international effect as regards appar-
ently self-executing treaties), Flaherty, supra note 56, at 2151-52 (focusing on eight-
eenth-century British and American history to argue that the traditional understanding
of treaties as self-executing is correct), and Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Laughing at Trea-
ties, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2169-73 (1999) (analyzing the text of the Supremacy
Clause to argue that treaties of the United States do not require implementing legisla-
tion to assume authority as law), with Yoo, Clobalism and the Constitution, supra note 56,
at 2040-69 (presenting a historical argument that treaties should be considered non-
self-executing in order to preserve the important distinction between domestic and
international policy-making), and Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 56, at
2233 ("[S]elf-execution would have the unfortunate effect of reading out of our Con-
stitution important aspects of the separation of powers and federalism, and would also
undermine the principle of popular sovereignty.").
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am particularly intrigued by the ways in which this debate over author-
ity clashes on the issue of federalism,"" with the national orientation
of the traditional approach on one hand and the state and local orien-
tation of the revisionists on the other.
I agree with the traditional view that the Constitution provides a
robust role for the federal government in domestic implementation of
human rights law. In this Article, I provide a different type of insight
about the federal role. In outlining possible ways in which the federal
government can share authority with state and local governments, this
Article resists a zero-sum approach to the question of authority and
suggests that norms both trickle down to subfederal governments and
trickle up to the federal government."" Rather than focus on the ex-
tent of the federal government's power to implement, interpret and
enforce international law, this Article questions why all three branches
of the federal government take a minimalist approach in exercising
this power, and suggests processes for encouraging greater inter-
governmental cooperation. As regards the executive branch and Sen-
ate, this minimalist approach suggests either lack of political will or
the presence of other priorities that crowd out attention to treaty rati-
fication and implementation. In the context of the federal judiciary,
the reluctance to invoke or rely on international law may reflect ef-
forts by the bench to position the judiciary strategically vis-A-vis otherbranches. 183
Whatever the explanation, the state and local activity described in
Part II suggests that subnational units of government are filling part of
the vacuum created by the federal government's minimalist approach
to human rights lawmaking. More than performing a gap-filling func-
tion, this state and local activity is directed largely at fostering greater
dialogue with and involvement by the federal government in human
rights lawmaking. As discussed above, state and local initiatives in the
181 While I am also intrigued by the ways in which concerns regarding separation
of powers among the federal branches factor into this debate, these concerns are
largely outside the scope of this Article.
192 For an indication that the position advanced in this Article is consistent with
(though not identical to) the traditional view, see discussion supra note 17 of Koh, su-
pra note 10.
183 See Benvenisti, supra note 48, at 173-75 (suggesting that judicial timidity is not
motivated by a lack of courage or knowledge, but rather is result of deeper factors such
as political advantage and opportunity to exert control over other branches of gov-
ernment); see also Knop, supra note 21, at 502 (disagreeing with the common view that
'Judges must still be educated, encouraged, and acculturated to apply international law
properly").
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context of women's human rights and the death penalty signal coor-
dinated efforts toward enlisting the federal government to implement,
respectively, CEDAW and a death penalty moratorium.
The process through which individuals and other actors demand
that government (at whatever level) convert abstract principles into
concrete law is captured by Cass Sunstein's observation that "[n]orm
cascades occur when societies are presented with rapid shifts toward
new norms." 18 This occurs "[w]hen the lowered cost of expressing
new norms encourages an ever-increasing number of people to reject
previously popular norms, to a 'tipping point' where it is adherence to
the old norms that produces social disapproval."85  As examples of
norm cascades, Professor Sunstein cites "the attack on apartheid in
South Africa, the fall of Communism, the election of Ronald Reagan,
the rise of the feminist movement, and the current assault on affirma-
tive action."'86
The concept of norm cascades is a useful one in analyzing the
ways in which state and local adoption of human rights norms (either
in binding laws or nonbinding resolutions) can lead to national ac-
ceptance of these norms, reflected by policy change through federal
legislation. Perhaps the most dramatic example of this phenomenon
is the role that state and local anti-apartheid laws played in securing
enactment of the federal Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act in
1986.187 A more recent example is the role that state and local anti-
Burma laws played in helping to pave the way for federal legislation
on Burma.8 8 Ironically, the Supreme Court found that the very fed-
eral law that state and local governments encouraged Congress to pass
preempted the Massachusetts state law. 8 However, Crosby leaves open
184 CAss R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIALJUsTIcE 38 (1997).
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 See Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, § 606, 100
Stat. 1089, 1115-16 (1986) (providing states and localities with temporary discretion to
enact anti-apartheid contract restrictions more secure than those promulgated by the
federal government); see also Byron Rushing, Presentation on International Law and
the Work of Federal and State Governments Panel, The American Society of Interna-
tional Law (ASIL) Annual Meeting (Apr. 4-7, 2001) (transcript on file with author).
188 See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
§ 570, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-166-67 (1997) (allowing the President to impose sanctions
against Burma by executive order until Burma improves its human rights practices and
makes its government more democratic); see also Rushing, supra note 187, at 3-4 (stat-
ing that Massachusetts passed the law "in order to put pressure on the federal govern-
ment").
18. Rushing, supra note 187, at 5 ("[The Crosby opinion] said that we had been
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the possibility of enactment of state and local initiatives that incorpo-
rate human rights norms domestically, so long as these initiatives are
not preempted by federal law.'9"
In international relations theory, political scientists Martha Fin-
nemore and Kathryn Sikkink describe a three-stage process through
which a norm's influence in the international community can be un-
derstood: (1) the emergence of the norm; (2) the broad acceptance
of the norm (or norm cascade) following a "tipping point," at which
"a critical mass of relevant [S] tate actors adopt the norm"; and (3) the
internalization of the norm.' 91 The internalization of international
norms into domestic law involves both vertical and horizontal com-
munication among transnational networks of various government ac-
tors (including judges) as well as nongovernmental actors linked
through technology, conferences, and other initiatives that facilitateS 192
globalization. Harold Koh explains that this internalization process
facilitates States' obedience to international law. 93 This Article sug-
gests that dialogic federalism may be a vehicle for the cascading and
internalization of norms.
The dialogic approach to human rights lawmaking explored in
this Article examines how international norms internalized at the
subnational level can be transmitted back up to the national level for
fuller translation of these norms into federal law. Of course, adoption
of these norms at the federal level may then lead to preemption of the
very state and local laws that paved the way for federal action-a di-
preempted by the legislation that we of course helped to pass in the United States
Congress.").
While Crosby leaves open the possibility of enactment of state and local laws that
promote external policy initiatives as well, the Court held that the Massachusetts anti-
Burma law was "an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress' full objectives under
the Federal Act." Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000).
191 Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political
Change, 52 INT'L ORG. 887, 895 (1998).
" See KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 96, at 3 (describing how activists, organized
around a shared idea or cause, communicate transnationally to "promote norm im-
plementation, by pressuring target actors to adopt new policies, and by monitoring
compliance with international standards"); Slaughter, International Law, supra note 95,
at 527-28 (discussing interactions among "the three domestic branches of government
in each State transnationally with one another").
193 Koh, supra note 96, at 626 (explaining that nations obey international law "be-
cause of a transnational legal process of interaction, interpretation, and internaliza-
tion"); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599,
2659 (1997) ("A transnational actor's moral obligation to obey an international norm
becomes an internally binding domestic legal obligation when that norm has been in-
terpreted and internalized into its domestic legal system.").
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lemma that may or may not create disincentives for subfederal ac-
tion. 1 4 Both case studies in Part III demonstrate how this two-way
transmission is assisted by dynamic interactions between local, na-
tional, and transnational advocacy networks that facilitate the transla-
tion of international law into language that is more broadly accessible
and relevant to the general public. "" By focusing on this dynamic
process, this Article suggests that even the adoption of nonbinding
norms (such as resolutions) at the state and local level can serve as a
vehicle for the implementation of human rights. " Dialogic federal-
ism envisions formal structures constrained by constitutional law (i.e.,
hard law), through which both soft and hard law norm development
are likely to occur at the state and local level in ways that are more
visible, manageable, and intelligible. Along with other scholarship on
international lawmaking within federal systems, 97 the dialogic ap-
proach suggested here may also serve to suggest new ways in which
domestic politics can intersect with international negotiations on hu-
man rights.' 8
The process of not only transmitting but also translating interna-
tional law through networks of subnational government and nongov-
ernment actors performs a dual function. First, as Sunstein's theory
194 See Rushing, supra note 187, at 3-4 (noting this dilemma in the context of the
federal law preempting the Massachusetts Burma law); supra note 189 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the preemption of state law by federal law in the Crosby case).
195 See KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 96, at 1-3 (describing how transnational advo-
cacy networks promote their policy agendas by framing those agendas to make them
resonate for local audiences); see also Fung et al., supra note 100, at 2-3 (describing a
system by which international firms would compete to be recognized as ethical em-
ployers, thereby ratcheting up international labor standards).
196 See Steve Ratner, Does International Law Matter in Preventing Ethnic Conflict?, 32
N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 591, 698 (2000) (citing the virtues of taking soft law into ac-
count in analyzing norm development and suggesting that the "reluctance to incorpo-
rate the element of softness into explanations of compliance" may relate to "an im-
plicit assumption that hard law will affect behavior more than will soft law"); see also
Chinkin, supra note 118, at 31-34 (discussing compliance with nonbinding norms).
197 See, e.g., Bermann, supra note 101, at 59 (describing how subnational actors
have consulted with their national governments regarding their views on proposed
trade agreements); Daniel Halberstam, Comparative Federalism and the Issue of Comman-
deering, in FEDERAL VISION: LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE U.S. AND
THE E.U. (Kalypso Nicolaidis & Robert Howse eds., forthcoming 2001) (manuscript at
1) (comparing Germany's and the United States' doctrines on commandeering),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taPabstract id=
2541 47 ).
19s See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level
Games, 42 INT'L. ORG. 427, 434 (1988) (describing how international negotiators must
play a two-level game by attempting to satisfy players at the national and international
levels).
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of norms cascades suggests, the process of translating human rights
norms (even in nonbinding resolutions) by ever-increasing numbers
of nonfederal government units pushes adoption of the norm to a
"tipping point." At the tipping point, a relevant mass of actors rejects
a previously popular norm or status quo and adheres to the new
norm. A second and equally important function that this norm-
translation process performs is in increasing what Professor Daniel
Halberstam calls the viscosity of international law.20 0 While Professor
Louis Henkin is surely correct in famously observing that "[i]t is
probably the case that almost all nations observe almost all principles of in-
ternational law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time," ,20
nevertheless, "[t] here are many instances where a [S] tate is admittedly
in violation" of international law. 1 As Halberstam points out, "even
deliberate and considered violations of international law continue to
be a practical possibility. °2 03 Because international law is a low-viscosity
system, noncompliance occurs "without irreparably tearing the fabric
of the governing legal orders," in contrast to a high-viscosity system
(such as the U.S. constitutional law system) in which "the compliance
pull preventing exit is quite high, and the costs of noncompliance are
both certain and great. ",2 4 Incorporating human rights norms into lo-
199 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 184, at 38 ("[T]he lowered cost of expressing new
norms encourages an ever-increasing number of people to reject previosly popular
norms, to a 'tipping point' where it is adherence to the old norms that produces socialdisapproval."); see also Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 191, at 895 (describing how, at
the "tipping point," a "critical mass of relevant state actors adopt the norm").
200 Halberstam, supa note 197 (manuscript at 10). Halberstam has also com-
mented:
Just as the 'viscosity' of a liquid reflects the forces of adhesion and friction that
act on a body moving through the fluid substance, so too, the viscosity of a le-
gal system may be viewed as a combination of the adhesive force of its norms,
i.e. the compliance pull that its norms exert on legal actors, and the friction
caused by non-compliant action, i.e. the real costs that actors incur by non-
compliance.
Id. (manuscript at 10) (relying on THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY
AMONG NATIONS 26 (1990), in which Franck developed the concept of "compliance
pull"; and Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74
IND. L.J. 1397, 1400 (1997), in which Koh discusses the elements of compliance,
namely, the awareness and acceptance of a rule for external, instrumental reasons).
201 Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979); see also Koh, supra
note 193, at 2599 (noting that empirical surveys have borne out this statement).
202 HENKIN, supra note 201, at 43; see also id. at 68-87 (discussing reasons for the
persistence of violations).
203 Halberstam, supra note 197 (manuscript at 12).
204 Id. (manuscript at 11) (relying on ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE ANDLOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970)); see
also GEORGE W. DOWNS & DAVID M. ROCKE, OPTIMAL IMPERFECTION? DOMESTIC
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cal law, state and local initiatives-particularly those that are legally
binding-may increase the viscosity of human rights law in the United
States.
In performing these two important functions, state and local ini-
tiatives incorporating human rights standards may facilitate legally en-
forceable commitments at the national level. Far from adopting the
revisionist perspective that states should displace, the federal govern-
ment in implementing, interpreting and enforcing international law,
however, this Article argues that the federal government should play a
strong leadership role in coordinating information regarding state
and local efforts to publicize best practices, to distill lessons learned,
and to extract workable norms for possible adoption at the national
level. Moreover, this Article stops short of endorsing more ambitious
proposals to involve state and local governments directly in the treaty-
making process.0 " While recognizing that subnational government
units have participated on a limited basis in the World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO) ,27 in trade negotiations, 8 and in various international
UNCERTAINTY AND INSTITUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL REIATIONS 77 (1995) (noting that
GATT "establish [es] sanctions for noncompliance that are low enough to allow politi-
cians to break the agreement when interest group benefits are great, but high enough
to encourage states to obey the agreement most of the time and thereby prevent trade
wars"); Benvenisti, supra note 92, at 196 (discussing "the opportunities for govern-
ments and small groups to evade specific [treaty] clauses with impunity").
205 Note that the bindingness of state and local initiatives incorporating human
rights norms matters more in performing the viscosity-strengthening function than it
does in performing the tipping-point function. Here, we may consider Halberstam's
helpful observation that
[t]he viscosity of a legal system is thus related to, but different from, the char-
acteristics of "hardness" or "softness" of legal rules, which refer principally to
the degree to which legal rules are binding as a normative matter as opposed
to the degree to which they are observed as a practical matter.
Halberstam, supra note 197 (manuscript at 11 n.42) (citing C.M. Chinkin, The Challenge
of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law, 38 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 850,
851 (1989), which describes hard laws as those that "specify the exact obligations un-
dertaken or the rights granted" and soft laws as those that provide only for "the grad-
ual acquiring of standards or for general goals").
200 See, e.g., Spiro, supra note 17, at 569 ("1 also propose that subnational entities be
afforded some mechanism to discretely [sic] associate with formal human rights re-
gimes.").
207 Id. at 592-93. Spiro describes the plurilateral Agreement on Government Pro-
curement's opt-in model, in which a "sub-central" government has the option of ac-
cepting the treaty regime by notifying the WTO through the relevant central govern-
ment. Id. at 592. Central governments remain the only formal parties to the
agreement, and are responsible for the violations by subnational governments but only
with regard to those "whose acceptance has been notified." Id. As of November 1997,
Spiro notes that "[tihirty-seven states ha[d] indicated their assent to the treaty terms to
the office of the U.S. Trade Representative, which in turn ha[d] transmitted accep-
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environmental conferences, '" examination of state and local govern-
ment involvement in such external international arenas is beyond the
scope of this Article.2 '0 As for internal domestic incorporation of hu-
man rights law, however, a stronger coordination role by the national
government is needed because "the Constitution created the institu-
tions of the federal government precisely to avoid such balkanization
of foreign policy and international affairs.,2 1' An Inter-Agency Work-
ing Group (along the lines of theme established under Executive Or-
der 13,107) could play such a coordination role.
Ultimately, it is in the federal government's national interest to
become more involved in monitoring and nurturing these local ef-
forts. Under international law, the federal government is responsible
for treaty violations of subnational governments and their officials . '
Even assuming international law eventually establishes liability for
113subnational governments, national governments will likely continue
tance to the WTO secretariat." Id. at 592-93. Significantly, Spiro points out that the
"Massachusetts state law restricting procurement from corporations doing business in
Burma... [became] the subject of a WTO complaint [asserted] by the European Un-
ion andJapan ... [and that it did] not appear to have resulted in the equivalent of de-
accession by subfederal governments." Id. at 593.
208 See Bermann, supra note 101, at 59 (discussing states' roles in consulting with
the United States regarding trade agreements).
209 See Spiro, supra note 17, at 594-95 (discussing involvement of subnational gov-
ernments at the 1992 Rio Conference on the Environment as well as at the more re-
cent Habitat II Summit in Istanbul).
210 For comparative investigations of the practice of other European countries and
notably Germany, whose subnational governments participate in the European Union,
see Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Committee on the Regions and the Role of Regional Governments
in the European Union, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 413, 423-30 (1997), compar-
ing Germany's, Belgium's, and Austria's national arrangements that permit subna-
tional input into decisions on European-level issues; Halberstam, supra note 197
(manuscript at 19-31), comparing Germany, the United States, and the European Un-
ion; Tushnet, supra note 38, at 1065-71, describing constitutional federalism in the
United States; and Juliane Kokott, Federal States in Federal Europe: The German Lander
and Problems of European Integration, in NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS IN THE ERA OF
INTEGRATION 175, 176 (AnteroJyranki ed., 1999), discussing "the interaction between
EU-level federalism and German federalism."
Koh, supra note 10, at 1841.
212 Bermann, supra note 101, at 60.
21 Going a step further than I am prepared to go in this Article, Professor Spiro
has called for the establishment of "condominium" responsibility, "under which both a
central government and its political subdivisions would be held legally accountable,"
an approach that would be "similar to joint and several liability under tort law." Spiro,
supra note 17, at 588-89. Establishment of such liability may be consistent with other
recent developments in international law establishing criminal responsibility for indi-
viduals accused of war crimes. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court Statute, June 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 999, 1002. Joint and several liability for subna-
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to be on the hook so long as these governments continue to assert
control over their constituent units.
At the same time, by cultivating the ability of state and local initia-
tives to serve as a vector for incorporation of human rights law, the
U.S. government could develop a broader and deeper commitment to
human rights. By theorizing new modes of democratic deliberation,
dialogic federalism could enable the federal government to deepen its
partnerships with subnational governments, through engagement in
dialogue and collaboration, which these state and local initiatives in-
vite.
tional and national governments might also be consistent with recent cases concerning
civil liability for corporations responsible for human rights violations. See, e.g., Wiwa v.
Royal Dutci Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 108 (2d Cir. 2000) (reversing dismissal of suit
for forum non conveniens), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 1402 (2001); Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc.,
142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (granting Texaco's motion to dismiss for fo-
rum non conveniens); Doe v. UNOCAL Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1312 (C.D. Cal
2000) (granting UNOCAL summary judgment on plaintiff's Alien Tort Claims Act and
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act claims and dismissing plaintiff's
state law claims without prejudice), affd, 248 F.3d 915, 931 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming
dismissal of defendant French corporation for lack of personal jurisdiction).
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